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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 










































































TIE CAMPAI GN! OF TIE ML WAR 

Noiv Ready—The Final Volume, 

XII—THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN OF ’64 & ’65. 

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC and THE ARMY OF THE JAMES. 

By ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS, 

Brigadier-General, Chief of Engineers, and Brevt. Major-General U.S.A.; Chief of 
Staff, Army of the Potomac ; commanding Second Corps, etc., etc. 

It is certain that no campaign during the Civil War engaged 
the services of so many commanders of high abilities or had 
such momentous results depending upon its success as the last 
campaign in Virginia under the immediate command of General 
Grant. The volume describing the series of operations which 
ended with the capture of Lee’s army and the downfall of the 
Southern confederacy may, therefore, be considered from the 
interest of its subject, the most important of the series of war 
histories which it brings to a close. It is fortunate in having 
for its author the one man who, by universal consent, is pre¬ 
eminently qualified to be the historian of the military opera¬ 
tions of this difficult and decisive campaign. 

No man connected with the Army of the Potomac was in a 
position to gain a more intimate and accurate knowledge of 
the course cf events from day to day than General Humphreys, 
and he has since had special facilities for availing himself of 
all possible sources cf information that relate to the history of 
this campaign. But it is the universal confidence in his per¬ 
sonal character and abilities that has given General Hum¬ 
phreys an almost unique place among military men and has 
caused this volume, his most important contribution to the 
literature of the war, to be awaited more eagerly than any 
other record of the military operations of the great conflict that 
has yet appeared. 

The size of the book necessarily largely exceeds the limits 
of those of the series that precede it. The maps are numerous 
and are unusually minute and accurate. 

1 Volume, 12mo, with eleven Maps, jtrepared under the 
direction of General Humphreys. 

PRICE, - $1.00. 

Charles Scribner’s Sons, Publishers^ 

743 & 745 Broadway, Xew York. 






Messrs. CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 

publish, under the general title of 

The CAMPAIGNS of the CIVIL WAR, 

A Series of volumes, contributed by a number of leading 
actors in and students of the great conflict of i 86 i -’65, with 
a view to bringing together, for the first time, a full and 
authoritative military history of the suppression of the 
Rebellion. 


The final and exhaustive form of this great narrative, in which every 
doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a possibility 
only of the future. But it is abnatter for surprise that twenty years 
after the beginning of the Rebellion, and when a whole generation 
has grown up needing such knowledge, there is no authority which is 
at the same time of the highest rank, intelligible and trustworthy, and 
to which a reader can turn for any general view of the field. 

The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other materi¬ 
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an ability to combine and proportion them which the ordinary reader 
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which have supplied this satisfactorily to any large part of the public. 
Undoubtedly there has been no such narrative as would be especially 
welcome to men of the new generation, and would be valued by a very 
great class of readers ;—and there has seemed to be great danger that 
the time would be allowed to pass when it would be possible to give 
to such a work the vividness and accuracy that come from personal 
recollection. These facts led to the conception of the present work. 

From every department of the Government, from the officers of the 
army, and from a great number of custodians of records and special infor¬ 
mation everywhere, both authors and publishers have received every aid 
that could be asked in this undertaking; and in announcing the issue of 
the work the publishers take this occasion to convey the thanks which 
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The price of each volume is $1.00. 


The following volumes are nozo ready: 

!•—The Outbreak of Rebellion. By John G. Nicolay, 
Esq., Private Secretary to President Lincoln; late Consul- 
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A preliminary volume, describing the opening of the war, and covering the 
period from the election of Lincoln to the end of the first battle of Bull Run. 











II.— From Fort Henry to Corinth . By the Hon. M. 
F. Force, Justice of the Superior Court, Cincinnatti; late 
Brigadier-General and Bvt. Maj. Gen’l, U.S.V., commanding 
First Division, 17th Corps: in 1862, Lieut. Colonel of the 
20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at Shiloh; Treasurer of 
the Society of the Army of the Tennessee. 

The narrative of events in the West from the Summer of 1861 to May, 1S62; 
covering the capture of Fts. Henry and Donelson, the Battle of Shiloh, etc., etc. 


Ill, — The Peninsula. By Alexander S. Webb, LL.D., 
President of the College of the City of New York: Assistant 
Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, i 86 i -’62 ; Inspector 
General Fifth Army Corps; General commanding 2d Div., 
2d Corps; Major General Assigned, and Chief of Staff, Army 
of the Potomac. 

The history of McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign, from his appointment to the 
end of the Seven Days’ Fight. 


IV.—The Army under Pope. By John C. Ropes, Esq., 
of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, the Massa¬ 
chusetts Historical Society, etc. 

From the appointment of Pope to command the Army of Virginia, to the appoint¬ 
ment of McClellan to the general command in September, 1862 


V,—The Antiefam and Fredericksburg. By France 
Winthrop Palfrey, Bvt. Brigadier Gen’l, U.S.V., and form¬ 
erly Colonel 20th Mass. Infantry; Lieut. Col. of the 20th 
Massachusetts at the Battle of the Antietam; Member of 
the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, of the Massa¬ 
chusetts Historical Society, etc. 

From the appointment of McClellan to the general command, September, 1862, ta 
the end of the battle of Fredericksburg. 


VI.—Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. By Abner 
Doubleday, Bvt. Maj. Gen’l, U. S. A., and Maj. Gen’l, 
U.S. V.; commanding the First Corps at Gettysburg, etc. 

From the appointment of Hooker, through the campaigns of Chancellorsville and 
Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee after the latter battle. 


VII.—The Army of the Cumberland. By Henry M. 
Cist, Brevet Brig. Gen’l U.S.V. ; A.A.G. on the staff of 
Major Gen’l Rosecrans, and afterwards on that of Major Gen’l 
Thomas ; Corresponding Secretary of the Society of the Army 
of the Cumberland. 

From the formation of the Army of the Cumberland to the end of the battles at 
Chattanooga, November, i86j. 


VIII.—The Mississippi, By Francis Vinton Greene, 
Lieut, of Engineers, U. S. Army; late Military Attache to the 
U. S. Legation in St. Petersburg; Author of “ The Russian 
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“Army Life in Russia.” 

An account of the operations—especially at Vicksburg and Port Hudson—by 
which the Mississippi River and its shores were restored to the control of the Union. 

IX. — Atlanta . By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox, Ex-Governor of 

Ohio; late Secretary of the Interior of the United States; 
Major General U. S.V., commanding Twenty-third Corps 
during the campaigns of Atlanta and the Carolinas, etc., etc. 

From Sherman’s first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to the beginning of 
the March to the Sea. 

X. —The March to the Sea—Franklin and Nashville . 

By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox. 

From the beginning of the March to the Sea to the surrender of Johnston— 
including also the operations of Thomas in Tennessee. 


XI.—The Shenandoah Valley in 1861. The Cam¬ 
paign of Sheridan. By George E. Pond, Esq., Asso¬ 
ciate Editor of the Army and Navy Journal . 


XII.—The Virginia Campaign of’61 and ’65. The 
Army of the Potomac and the Army of the 
lames. By Andrew A. Humphreys, Brigadier General 
and Bvt. Major General, U, S. A. ; late Chief of Engineers; 
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, 1863-64; commanding 
Second Corps, 1864-’65, etc., etc. 

Statistical Iiecord of the Armies of the United 
States. By Frederick Phisterer, late Captain U. S. A. 

This Record includes the figures of the quotas and men actually furnished by 
all States ; a list of all organizations mustered into the U. S. service; the strength 
of the army at various periods ; its organization in armies, corps, etc.; the divisions 
of the country into departments, etc.; chronological list of all engagements, with the 
losses in each ; tabulated statements of all losses in the war, with the causes of 
death, etc.; full lists of all general officers, and an immense amount of other valuable 
statistical matter relating to the War. 


The complete Set, thirteen volumes, in a box. Price, $12.50 
Single volumes, . . . . . . i.eo 

*** The above books for sale by all booksellers, or will be sent, post-paid, 
upon receipt 0/ price, by 

CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 


















GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN 











FROM 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN 


THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 

July, 1863, to April, 1864 


ANDREW A, 


Y 

.«> s 





UMPHREYS 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL, CHIEF Of ENGINEERS, AND BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. A.; 
MAJOR-GENERAL VOLS.; CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC; 
COMMANDING SECOND CORPS, ETC., ETC. 


JUN 21 1883 / 

> No. 

washing^ 


NEW YORK 

CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 

1883 


Cv\3> 










£>70 

.z 

■y? 


Copyright, 1883, 

By CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS. 




press of J. J. Little & co., 

BOS. 10 TO 20 ASTOR PLACE, NEW YORK. 


PREFACE. 


The contents of this volume were intended to 
form the first part of Vol. XII. of the Scribner 
Campaigns of the Civil War. But they were neces¬ 
sarily excluded from that volume by its bulk. 

The brevity that characterizes Volume XII. will 
also be found in this narrative, for I have had no 
time to change its character. Properly, its publi¬ 
cation should have preceded that of Vol. XII. 

The information needed for the preparation of 
these chapters was fuller and more readily obtained 
than that required for Vol. XII. 

I am under obligations to the Secretary of War 
for making accessible to me all the papers of his 
Department relating to the War, and to Genl. 
Drum, Adjt.-Genl. ; and to Col. Scott, in charge of 
the preparation of the “ Official Records of the 
Union and Confederate Armies,” for publication, 
and to the gentlemen having charge of the sub- 
offices of the Adjt.-Genl’s Department. 

A. A. Humphreys. 

June t 1883. 

V 



















CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER I. 

PAGE 

General Lee retreats from Gettysburg and 

CROSSES THE POTOMAC AT WILLIAMSPORT, IN¬ 
TRENCHING HIS POSITION TO COVER THE CROSS¬ 
ING—GENERAL Meade follows in pursuit by his 
LEFT FLANK—FINDS LEE COVERED BY INTRENCH- 
MENTS TOO STRONG TO ATTACK WITHOUT CAREFUL 
EXAMINATION ; BUT HIS RECONNOISSANCE IN FORCE 
IS TOO LATE TO PREVENT THE CROSSING—WHILE 

covering Washington, Meade forces Lee to 

ABANDON THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY, WITH ITS 
LARGE FOOD SUPPLIES, AND TO TAKE POSITION BE¬ 
TWEEN the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. . i 

CHAPTER II. 

The movement to Centreville—Meade advances 
against Lee, who is forced to withdraw be¬ 
yond the Rapidan.12 

CHAPTER III. 

General Meade crosses the Rapidan, expecting to 
surprise General Lee, and encounter his 

FORCES IN DETAIL—THE PLAN IS FRUSTRATED BY 
THE FAILURE OF THE THIRD CORPS TO UNITE WITH 

vii 




Vlll 


CONTENTS. 


the Second and Sixth Corps on the morning 

OF THE SECOND DAY AT ROBERTSON’S TAVERN— 

Meade advances to Mine Run—Makes disposi¬ 
tions TO ATTACK LEE, BUT FINDING HIM TOO 
STRONGLY POSTED AND INTRENCHED, WITHDRAWS 
TO HIS FORMER POSITION ON THE RAPIDAN. ... 49 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Army of the Potomac makes a demonstration 
against Lee on the Rapidan to aid General 
Butler’s proposed attack on Richmond, but 

ONLY SPOILS ITS OWN CHANCE FOR SURPRISING LEE 
IN HIS WINTER QUARTERS—KILPATRICK’S ATTEMPT 

to capture Richmond and release the prison¬ 
ers of Libby and other Military Prisons. . . 71 

Appendix.81 


LIST of maps. 


Gettysburg to the Rapidan. 

Mine Run. 

Virginia, between Washington and Richmond. 


The maps are placed at the end of this volume. 






GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


FROM JULY, 1863, TO MARCH, 1864. 


CHAPTER I. 

General Lee retreats from Gettysburg and crosses the Potomac at 
Williamsport, intrenching his position to cove-r the crossing— 
General Meade follows in pursuit by his left flank—Finds Lee 
covered by intrenchments too strong to attack without careful 
examination ; but his reconnoissance in force is too late to pre¬ 
vent the crossing—While covering Washington, Meade forces 
Lee to abandon the Shenandoah Valley, with its large food 
supplies, and to take position between the Rappahannock and 
the Rapidan. 

Tpie evening of the 3d of July closed the fighting 
at Gettysburg. The 4th and part of the 5th were 
occupied by the Army of the Potomac in attend¬ 
ing to the wounded and burying the dead. 

A field return of the army on the 5th of July 
showed that its seven infantry corps had, on an 
average, the numbers usually found in a division, 
four of them having about 5,000 enlisted men each, 
the total of the seven amounting to 47,087 enlisted 
men armed and equipped. 

On the night of the 4th of July the Army of 
Northern Virginia began its retreat, leaving behind 

a large number of its wounded. Preparations for 

1 



2 GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 

this were begun on the night of the 3d, and con¬ 
tinued during the 4th, the trains being sent forward. 
Their route was by way of the Fairfield Pass, 
through the Blue Mountains to Hagerstown and 
Williamsport on the Potomac, the shortest road 
from Gettysburg to that place, where there is a 
good ford except in flood-stages of the river, and 
in the close vicinity of which, at Falling Waters, 
General Lee had had a ponton bridge. A part of 
the trains moved by way of the Cashtown Pass, 
north of the Fairfield, guarded by General Imbo- 
den’s brigade of cavalry and mounted infantry. 

As soon in the morning of the 5th as it was as¬ 
certained that Lee was in retreat, Major-General 
Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Corps, 11,000 
strong—the strongest corps in the Army—was or¬ 
dered in pursuit on the Fairfield road, taking a 
brigade of cavalry with him; a brigade of cavalry 
was also dispatched on the Cashtown road to 
harass that column. Buford, commanding the First 
Cavalry Division, was sent by way of Frederick to 
endeavor to capture or destroy the enemy’s trains 
at Williamsport; and Kilpatrick, commanding the 
Third Cavalry Division, by way of the Monterey 
Pass (south of the Fairfield Pass) to intercept the 
trains and harass the retreating force. The Fair- 
field and Cashtown passes were known to afford 
naturally strong positions, and it was stated they 
had been intrenched so that a small force could 
hold a large one in check some time. This infor¬ 
mation concerning the Fairfield Pass, which is 
midway between Gettysburg and Hagerstown, 


LEE RETREATS TOWARD VIRGINIA. 


3 


being about 15 miles from each, was confirmed by 
General Sedgwick on the morning of the 6th, at 
which time he also reportea that the main body 
of the enemy was in the vicinity of the pass, and 
that an engagement might be had with them. 

This information led to holding the First and 
Third Corps ready to move to Fairfield Pass, and 
to suspending the flank movement through Mid¬ 
dletown and South Mountain toward Hagerstown 
and Williamsport, which had already been com¬ 
menced by the other corps of the army ; for General 
Meade had concluded that, considering the delays 
he might meet with in the passes, he could follow 
the enemy more rapidly by the flank route than 
by direct pursuit. In the afternoon General Sedg¬ 
wick reported that, although the pass was a strong 
one, he could take it, but that it would involve 
delay and waste of time to endeavor to push the 
enemy further on that road. Accordingly, on the 
morning of the 7th, the whole army moved by the 
flank routes through the Catoctin Mountains by 
the Hamburg and High Knob passes, and by way 
of Frederick. The heavy rains of the night of the 
7th and all day of the 8th caused delays in these 
passes, and the army was not concentrated at Mid¬ 
dletown until the morning of the 9th. By the 
evening of that day it had passed the Blue Ridge 
and halted for the night with its right at Boons- 
boro’ and its left at Rohrersville, on the roads 
leading to Hagerstown and to Williamsport, and 
from twelve to fifteen miles from them. A bri¬ 
gade of cavalry, supported by one of infantry, had 



4 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPID AN. 


been left to follow the enemy through the Fair- 
field Pass. 

General French, with a division of 6,500 men, 
joined the Army of the Potomac on the 8th, and 
was assigned to the command of the Third Corps, 
his division uniting with it. 

In the meantime General Kilpatrick had, on the 
5th, broken into and destroyed a part of the 
enemy’s trains, and afterward had encountered 
their cavalry. 

Late in the afternoon of the 6th he had attacked 
the enemy at Hagerstown, while Buford attacked 
at Williamsport, but both without success, the 
enemy’s cavalry being there in force, together with 
some infantry. 

The leading troops of the Army of Northern 
Virginia arrived at Hagerstown on the afternoon 
of the 6th, the rear of the army reaching there on 
the morning of the 7th. The Potomac was found 
to be much swollen from the heavy rains that had 
fallen almost incessantly from the 1st of July. The 
Williamsport ford was too deep to be used, and 
the ponton bridge had been partially destroyed by 
a cavalry detachment sent for the purpose by 
General French from Frederick during the battle 
of Gettysburg. 

The Confederate Army took up a good position 
selected to cover these two crossing places, the 
right resting on the river near Downsville, and the 
left in the vicinity of Hagerstown, covering the 
road from that place to Williamsport. Owing to 
the proximity of Conococheague Creek—which, 


LEE CROSSES THE POTOMAC. 


5 


coming from the north, empties into the Potomac 
at Williamsport—and the stone fences of the roads 
leading to it from the left, through a very open 
and comparatively level country, a movement 
against that flank could be readily met. 

The position taken by Lee ran along a range of 
high ground, and was strongly intrenched. The 
crossing-places were also suitably prepared for 
covering the passage of the river. Part of the pon¬ 
ton bridge was recovered, boats were built, and 
every preparation made for reestablishing the bridge 
as speedily as possible. 

The road Lee had taken from Gettysburg to 
Williamsport was about half the length of the route 
taken by the Army of the Potomac, and Lee had 
the advantage, always possessed by the army that 
withdraws under the cover of night, of gaining 
several hours. 

On the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th of July, the cavalry 
of the two armies had spirited engagements that 
preceded the advance of the infantry columns of 
the Army of the Potomac. By the night of the 
10th of July the Twelfth, Second, Fifth, and Third 
Corps of that army were across Antietam Creek, 
and in front of the enemy’s right; the Sixth, 
Eleventh, and First Corps were near Funkstown 
and Hagerstown on the pike from Frederick. 

On the nth of July all the corps were thrown 
forward, and sent out strong reconnoissances to feel 
the enemy and ascertain how he was posted ; and 
on the 12th these were continued close up to the 
enemy’s position, and Funkstown and Hagers- 


6 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


town were occupied by the Sixth and Eleventh 
Corps. j 

General W. F. Smith, with a force of four or five I 
thousand men, who had just entered the service 
temporarily, joined the army on the nth and was 1 
posted at Boonsboro. \ 

General Meade, with the Chief of Staff and the j 
Chief Engineer, had examined the enemy’s position 
and intrenchments as closely as practicable soon after 
coming up with him. Wherever seen, the position 
was naturally strong, and was strongly intrenched ; , 

it presented no vulnerable points, but much of it 
was concealed from view. As already described, 
its flanks were secure and could not be turned. 

In this condition of affairs General Meade deter¬ 
mined on the evening of the 12th to move forward 
the next morning, make a reconnoissance in force, 
supported by the whole army, feel the enemy, and 
attack him where weakest if it should give any 
promise of success. 

In view of an attack upon the enemy, some in¬ 
trenchments had been thrown up, as, in the contin¬ 
gency of a repulse and serious loss, they would be 
useful. The corps commanders were sent for on \ 
the evening of the 12th to ascertain what further j 
information they had obtained, to give them in- Z 
structions for the next day’s operation, and to afford 
them an opportunity for a full understanding with 
each other concerning it. But their opinion was 
found to be so adverse to the proposed operation, 
that General Meade postponed it until he could 
examine the position of the enemy more closely. 





LEE CROSSES THE POTOMAC. 


7 


That examination, so far as it was practicable, was 
made on the 13th, and the order for the reconnois- 
sance in force to be made on the morning of the 14th 
was issued, and suitable preparations made for it. 
On advancing, it was found that the enemy had 
withdrawn on the night of the 13th, crossing the 
river chiefly on the ponton bridge, Ewell’s Corps 
using the ford. The advance was continued to the 
river, but the infantry of the Army of the Potomac 
was unable to overtake the enemy. Buford’s and 
Kilpatrick’s divisions of cavalry overtook and at¬ 
tacked the rear guard at Falling Waters, and brought 
back two guns, three battle-flags and many prison¬ 
ers, a large part of whom were, doubtless, stragglers. 

A careful survey of the intrenched position of 
the enemy was made, and showed that an assault 
upon it would have resulted disastrously to us. 
Nevertheless, General Meade was, at the time, 
greatly blamed for not attacking it,* and he was 
also criticised for not following Lee more rapidly, 
probably with the idea that by doing so Lee would 
have been overtaken before he had intrenched or 
before his intrenchments were formidable. 

Possibly a prompt, vigorous, direct pursuit by the 
whole army on the morning of the 5th of July by 
the Cashtown and Fairfield passes would have 
,brought on a general engagement before the Army 
of Northern Virginia had taken up the position 
covering the crossing-places of the Potomac; but 

* On the other hand, General Burnside was severely criticised for 
attacking at Marye Heights, Fredericksburg, where the intrench¬ 
ments were not more formidable than those of Williamsport. 






8 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


probably it could not have reached Hagerstown be¬ 
fore the evening of the 7th, and Lee would have 
had the few hours needed to make his intrench- 
ments too strong for successful attack.* 

The other criticism adverted to was probably 
materially modified before the war closed. 

On the 14th of July Gregg’s division of cavalry 
was sent across the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry on 
a reconnoissance, and on the 15th moved to Shep- 
herdstown, in the vicinity of which on the 16th it 
was attacked by General Fitzhugh, Lee with his 
own and Chambliss’s brigades supported by Jen¬ 
kins’s, but maintained its position. The fighting 
ceased at night, and Gregg fell back to Harper’s 
Ferry unmolested, his rear leaving Shepherdstown 
at daylight on the 17th. 

On the 15th of July Lee marched to the vicinity 
of Bunker Hill, where his army remained several 
days. 

In view of the question of supplies, the Army of 
the Potomac marched on the flank of the enemy, 
crossing the Potomac on the 17th and 18th at 
Harper’s Ferry and a few miles below, at Berlin, on 
ponton bridges, and, moving up Loudoun Valley, 
occupied the passes through the Blue Ridge with 
cavalry and infantry, while it covered the piked' 
roads leading from the position of Lee’s army 
through Snicker’s Gap and Leesburg to Washing¬ 
ton, and through Ashby’s Gap and Aldie to the 


* A column sent through the Cashtown Pass would have opened 
the Fairfield Pass at once. The distance from Gettysburg to 
Hagerstown by the Catoctin Pass is not less than forty miles. 



LEE ABANDONS THE VALLEY. 


9 


same point. Buford’s cavalry division was sent, on 
the 2ist, to occupy Manassas Gap and watch 
Chester Gap, and was followed by the Third, Fifth, 
and Second Corps, which entered Manassas Gap on 
the 23d. 

When Lee recrossed the Potomac he had intended 
to move into the well-cultivated farming region of 
Loudoun County, but the Shenandoah was then im¬ 
passable, and these dispositions of the Army of the 
Potomac not only cut him off from Loudoun, but 
made him apprehend being cut off from the railroad 
to Richmond. He therefore ordered General 
Longstreet on the 19th to move to Culpeper Court 
House by way of Front Royal. Longstreet moved 
on the 20th, and succeeded in passing through 
Chester Gap without interruption on the 22d, fol¬ 
lowed by Hill, and arrived at the Court House on 
the 24th. 

General Ewell had been sent on the 21st to capt¬ 
ure a force under General Kelly that was protect¬ 
ing the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Mar- 
tinsburg ; but General Kelly eluded him. Follow¬ 
ing Longstreet and Hill, Ewell, with Rhodes’s and 
Johnson’s divisions, passed through Front Royal 
on the 23d, and entered Chester Gap, which, in its 
western portion, is close to and but little separated 
from Manassas Gap. Here, in the afternoon, he 
found Wright’s brigade of Anderson’s division, 
Hill’s corps, which had been left to hold the pass 
until he (Ewell) should come up, and at once sup¬ 
ported it with Rhodes’s division; for he also found 

there the head of the column, composed of the 
1* 


10 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


Third, Fifth, and Second Corps advancing through 
the gap. A brief, spirited encounter between the 
advanced forces of the opposing columns ensued, 
the Excelsior brigade, General Spinola command¬ 
ing, charging and driving its opponent back upon 
its main force, inflicting a severe loss in killed, 
wounded, and prisoners. 

General Ewell, finding so strong a force in his 
front, fell back to Front Royal, and the next morn¬ 
ing moved up the south fork of the Shenandoah to 
Luray, crossing the Blue Ridge by Thornton’s Gap, 
and going to Madison Court House. General 
Early, who was following far in the rear, was 
obliged to move up the north fork to join Ewell. 

The Army of the Potomac moved to the Rap¬ 
pahannock River, where it was directed from 
Washington to take up a threatening position, but 
not to advance against Lee, who was in position in 
the vicinity of Culpeper Court House, between the 
Rappahannock and the Rapidan. 

On the 1st of August General Buford, on a re- 
connoisance with his cavalry division, advanced to 
Brandy Station (between the Rappahannock and 
the Rapidan), driving in the enemy’s cavalry, 
Hampton’s brigade, until they were supported by 
infantry. Subsequent to this, Lee withdrew his 
infantry to the south bank of the Rapidan—a bet¬ 
ter position for his purposes than that along the 
Rappahannock or at Culpeper Court House. 

By the middle of August a considerable number 
of troops had been withdrawn from the Army of 
the Potomac for duty elsewhere. 


MEADE AT CULPEPER. 


II 


It having been ascertained * that General Long- 
street’s Corps had been withdrawn from the Army 
of Northern Virginia and sent West, except Pick¬ 
ett’s division, which remained on the south side of 
James River, the cavalry and the Second Corps of 
the Army of the Potomac were thrown across the 
Rappahannock on the 13th of September, and drove 
the enemy’s cavalry over the Rapidan, the crossing- 
places of which were found to be well intrenched. 
The army followed, and took position about 
Culpeper Court House, the Second and Sixth 
Corps being thrown forward near the railroad 
crossing of the Rapidan. 

Buford was sent on a reconnoisance to the upper 
Rapidan, and a movement by the right flank to 
cross that river was about being made, when it was 
suspended by orders from Washington, and the 
Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were withdrawn from 
the Army of the Potomac and sent West. 

* By Col. George H. Sharpe, Chief of the Secret Service Depart¬ 
ment of the Army of the Potomac. 



CHAPTER II. 


The movement to Centreville—Meade advances against Lee, who 
is forced to withdraw beyond the Rapidan. 

By the 9th of October some of the troops sent 
away in the summer were returned to the army, 
and a good many recruits had been sent to it, so 
that the subject of a movement by the right flank 
was resumed. 

On the afternoon of the 7th a signal despatch 
from General Stuart to General Fitzhugh Lee was 
read by our signal officer on Pony Mountain, direct¬ 
ing him to draw three days’ hard bread and bacon, 
which indicated a movement of some kind, sup¬ 
posed to be a cavalry operation on our right ; and 
Prince’s division of the Third Corps was ordered 
to James City to support Kilpatrick’s cavalry divi¬ 
sion. On the 8th General Sedgwick reported indi¬ 
cations of a movement of the enemy on our right. 
On the 9th General Meade and myself rode to 
Cedar Mountain to have a better look at the 
country in the direction of a certain pass through 
Southwest Mountain, having in view the movement 
by the right flank. Soon after we reached the 
mountain information was received from the Sixth 
Corps pickets that there was infantry among the 
troops moving on our right, and before we left the 
mountain columns of infantry, as well as calvary, 


CENTREYILLE MOVEMENT. 


13 


were seen by us across the upper Rapidan, moving 
in the direction of Madison Court House. 

General Pleasonton, commanding the Cavalry 
Corps, was strongly impressed with the idea that 
the Confederate Government intended to abandon 
Virginia, and that this movement on our right was 
a feint, under cover of which the Army of Northern 
Virginia was to be withdrawn from the Rapidan to 
Richmond, so that the Confederate authorities could 
abandon that city under its protection. General 
Lee, in his report of this operation, states that it 
was made with the design of bringing on an en¬ 
gagement with the Army of the Potomac, and that 
his “ army crossed the Rapidan on the 9th instant 
and advanced by way of Madison Court House,” 
that his “ progress was necessarily slow, as the march 
was by circuitous and concealed roads, in order to 
avoid the observation of the enemy.” As yet, how¬ 
ever (on the evening of the 9th), the character and 
object of the movement were undeveloped, and in 
this state of uncertainty, while Kilpatrick was or¬ 
dered to watch the movements of the enemy in the 
direction of the roads from Madison Court House 
to Woodville, and Thornton and Chester gaps, and 
Warrenton, as well as to Culpeper Court House, 
Buford was ordered, on the evening of the 9th, to 
cross the Rapidan at Germanna Ford, move up that 
river, and follow the enemy to Orange Court House. 
General Newton, commanding the First Corps, was 
directed to cross at Morton’s Ford when Buford 
arrived there, and Sedgwick to cross at the fords 
in his front simultaneously with Newton; and Sykes, 


H 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


commanding the Fifth Corps, to unite with them, 
and as preliminary to it, to mass his corps near 
them, screened from observation. They were all 
informed that the movements ordered were based 
upon the supposition that the enemy was retiring 
from the Rapidan, though that might prove to be 
erroneous, and it might be found that he was really 
moving to turn our right flank. General Benham, 
commanding the Engineer Brigade, was ordered to 
Washington to procure a bridge equipage sufficient 
to build two bridges across the Rappahannock at 
Fredericksburg. 

When the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rap¬ 
pahannock in September, a position in front of 
Culpeper Court House was selected to betaken up 
in the event of the Army of Northern Virginia ad¬ 
vancing to Culpeper Court House to bring on an 
engagement. The right of this position covered the 
Sperryville pike ; the left extended across the direct 
road to James City and Madison Court House. On 
the morning of the ioth the Third and Second 
Corps occupied the right of the position, and the 
tlyee infantry corps on the Rapidan were advised 
to be ready to occupy the left. 

During the day the information received from 
General Kilpatrick, whose cavalry were active in 
forcing a disclosure of the true character of the 
movement, rendered it certain that Lee’s army was 
moving on our right, either to advance directly upon 
Culpeper Court House or toward Warrenton, or to 
the Valley of the Shenandoah, by Thornton and 
Chester gaps. The three infantry corps on the 


CENTREVILLE MOVEMENT. 


5 


Rapidan were therefore ordered to move up as 
soon as it was dark, and take position on the left of 
the Second Corps. But by night it was ascertained 
that Lee’s army was moving toward Woodville, some 
fifteen miles north-west of Culpeper Court House, 
and General Davies, of Kilpatrick’s cavalry division, 
reported that the head of the enemy’s column was 
already on Hazel River, in the vicinity of Turkey- 
hole Mountain.* This evinced a design on his part 
not to advance upon Culpeper Court House, but to 
turn our right, and by placing himself on our lines 
of communication with Washington (the Warren- 
ton pike and the railroad), to bring on an engage¬ 
ment in a position selected by himself, or, perhaps, 
again to enter the Shenandoah Valley. 

Respecting these designs, it is to be observed that 
General Lee states in his report that “when the 
movement of the army from the Rapidan com¬ 
menced, General Imboden was instructed to ad¬ 
vance down the valley [of the Shenandoah] and 
guard the gaps of the mountains on our left.” This 
would have been an entirely useless operation on 
the part of General Imboden if the object of Gen¬ 
eral Lee’s movement was merely to bring on an en¬ 
gagement at Culpeper Court House. 

As General Lee was already as near to Warren- 
ton as we were, General Meade decided to move at 

*The advance to the vicinity of Turkey-hole Mountain may have 
been merely preliminary to the movement to Culpeper Court House 
by the Sperryville pike, but it had every appearance of a movement 
around our right flank. The shortest and quickest advance to the 
Court House for Lee’s army was by the road leading directly to it 
from James City. 





16 GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 

once to the vicinity of that town and attack Lee 
while crossing the Rappahannock at the Waterloo 
and Sulphur Springs crossings. The movement of 
the troops began from the vicinity of Culpeper 
Court House at 3 o’clock in the morning of the 
nth of October, and by night the army was across 
the Rappahannock, extending from Freeman’s 
Ford to Kelly’s Ford, and covering the railroad. 
The trains preceded the movement. The cavalry— 
Buford’s and Kilpatrick’s divisions, with one bri¬ 
gade of Gregg’s division, under General Pleasonton, 
supported by the Third and Fifth Corps—covered 
the movement, Pleasonton having a sharp engage¬ 
ment with the whole of the enemy’s cavalry— 
Fitzhugh Lee’s and Hampton’s divisions, under 
General Stuart. 

To return to General Buford, who crossed the 
Rapidan at Germanrra Ford early on the 10th and 
moved up to Morton’s Ford by night. General 
I 7 itzhugh Lee, with his division of cavalry and a 
deta'chment of infantry, had remained to hold the 
Confederate lines south of the Rapidan, while 
General Stuart, with Hampton’s division, moved 
on the right flank of Lee’s army. On the morning 
of the nth General Buford received orders to re¬ 
cross the Rapidan and move to the Rappahannock 
River. Crossing at Morton’s Ford, he was at¬ 
tacked by Lee’s division, supported by the in¬ 
fantry detachment, which attack he repulsed, as 
he did a second attack near Stevensburg, where 
he remained to cover the withdrawal of a wagon 
train, and then slowly withdrew, followed by the 



CENTREVILLE MOVEMENT. 17 

enemy to Brandy Station, where he joined General 
Pleasonton, and took part in the engagement with 
General Stuart. The presence of this infantry 
detachment with General Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry 
gave rise, I think, to the unfortunate misapprehen¬ 
sion, on the part of the commanders of the rear 
guard of the Army of the Potomac, that General 
Lee had moved his whole army to Culpeper Court 
House. General Lee says that his main body 
arrived near that place on the nth of October, but 
he does not specify where they halted that night, 
and all the information I have obtained goes to 
show that no part of their main infantry columns 
came nearer to it than the direct roads from 
Madison Court House and James City to War- 
renton ; that is, from five to ten miles distant. 

General Gregg, with his cavalry division, was 
sent on the nth to the vicinity of the Sulphur 
Springs, on the Rappahannock, to watch the roads 
Lee would take leading to Warrenton and to the 
Shenandoah Valley by Chester and Thornton 
gaps through Sperryville and Little Washington. 
It was enjoined upon him that it was informa¬ 
tion of Lee’s movements solely that he was sent 
after, and that it was important that any he ob¬ 
tained should be received at headquarters at the 
earliest moment. General Meade states that upon 
the arrival of the rear guard on the evening of the 
nth, the representations of General Pleasonton, 
commanding its cavalry, and General Sykes, com¬ 
manding its infantry, gave him the impression that 
General Lee had moved to Culpeper Court House 


1 8 GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 

with his whole army to attack there, and that he 
then occupied that place. This led to a suspension 
of the movement toward Warrenton the next 
morning. 

Up to midday of the 12th no information of any 
kind concerning the enemy had been received, and 
under the belief that Lee must be in his rear at 
Culpeper Court House, General Meade, between 
twelve and one o’clock in the afternoon, ordered 
the Fifth, Sixth, and Second Corps, with Buford’s 
cavalry, back to that place with a view to give Lee 
battle. As they approached it toward sunset the 
cavalry had some skirmishing with small parties of 
the enemy’s cavalry, but Lee’s army was not 
there, nor was' any information concerning it 
gained. 

Near ten o’clock at night a dispatch was re¬ 
ceived by me from General Gregg, stating that 
about noon he had encountered the head of Lee’s 
army on the west bank of the Rappahannock 
moving to Warrenton by way of the Sulphur 
Springs and Waterloo crossings ; that, after a per¬ 
sistent resistance (which was well managed) he had 
been driven across the Rappahannock River and 
forced back six or eight miles from the roads to 
Warrenton, and that Lee’s army had been cross¬ 
ing the river for several hours. Its leading troops 
were, therefore, within a few miles of Warrenton. 
No sound of this engagement had reached us, 
although there had been heavy artillery-fire. 
Shortly after this information was received by 
General Meade, the pickets of the Third Corps 


CENTREVILLE MOVEMENT. 


19 


farthest up the river began to be driven in. The 
army was at once got in motion, and by ten o’clock 
on the night of the 13th of October the right of the 
Third Corps was at Greenwich, some two miles 
from the Warrenton pike at Buckland Mills ; the 
Second Corps at Auburn; the Fifth Corps at Cat¬ 
lett’s; the Sixth Corps on the railroad between 
Catlett’s and Bristoe stations, and the First Corps 
near Bristoe Station. Kilpatrick’s cavalry division 
was on the Warrenton pike at New Baltimore in 
contact with that of the enemy, supported, it was 
said, by their infantry. Gregg’s division was near 
Auburn on the left of the Second Corps, and 
Buford’s guarding the trains moving to Brentsville. 

General Lee states in his report that on the 
morning of the 12th of October his army marched 
in two columns, with the design of reaching the 
Orange and Alexandria Railroad north of the river 
and interrupting our movement.* 

The actual position of Lee’s infantry on the 
evening of the 13th was not known to General 
Meade. The head of one of its columns was 
believed to be on the Warrenton pike, near New 
Baltimore, and the other on the road from Warren¬ 
ton through Thoroughfare Gap, Gainesville, and 


* The First Maine Cavalry of General I. Irvin Gregg’s brigade 
of the Second Division, in returning from its reconnoissance to 
Sperryville and Little Washington, on the evening of the 12th, ran 
into the infantry of General A. P. Hill’s corps, between Gaines’s 
cross-roads and Amissville, showing that Hill’s corps had moved 
by way of Woodville, as indicated by our information of Lee’s 
movements on the evening of the 10th. 



ii 


20 GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 

Groveton. Some of his cavalry was at New Balti¬ 
more, some in the vicinity of Auburn. Our pickets 
were reported to be in contact with those of the 
enemy’s cavalry from Greenwich to Auburn, and 
staff officers of the Second and Third Corps, carry¬ 
ing orders from the headquarters of the army to 
their corps during the night, ran into the enemy’s 
cavalry, though escaping capture. 

When the army was established for the night, 
the question what should next be done was the 1 
subject of long examination and discussion by Gen- | 
eral Meade and myself. The country between 
Cedar Run and Broad Run, the Warrenton pike and 
the Alexandria Railroad, was almost unknown to ' 
us. The pike and the railroad were here seven 
miles apart, and from the information then had, 
confirmed by all subsequently obtained, the disad¬ 
vantages of any position in the area mentioned 
were too great to admit of its being adopted, sup¬ 
posing Lee’s army had not advanced farther than 
Warrenton. Ary position at or in the near vicin¬ 
ity of the Manassas or Bull Run battle-fields was 
objectionable because of the former operations 
there; and with great reluctance General Meade 
concluded to take up the position of Centreville, 
which he believed General Lee was moving to get 
possession of.* 

* Halting on Broad Run, near Milford, until the position and 
movements of Lee’s army could be exactly ascertained, was consid¬ 
ered ; but the information had, up to the night of the 13th, indi¬ 
cated plainly that Lee was trying to turn Meade’s right flank (as he 
says he was in his letter of the 15th of October to the Secretary of 
War at Richmond), and might accomplish his object by moving on 





CENTREVILLE MOVEMENT. 


21 


At a late hour of the night the order for the 
movement was issued. The corps upon the rail¬ 
road were to march on either side of it until they 
reached the road diverging from it to Mitchell’s 
and Blackburn’s fords of Bull Run. The Third 
Corps was to move from Greenwich to Milford, on 
Broad Run, a mile above Bristoe Station, and 
Mience along the railroad; the Second Corps to 
move along Cedar Run to Catlett’s, and thence 
along the railroad; General Kilpatrick along the 
Warrenton pike and to Sudley Springs on Bull 
Run; General Gregg to cover the rear and flank of 
the Second Corps. The corps commanders were 
directed to keep up constant communication with 
the corps in front and rear, and mutually support 
each other. 

The information General Meade had as to the 
position of Lee’s army on the evening of the 13th 
of October was, however, erroneous; and the move¬ 
ment of our army on the 14th, based upon that in¬ 
formation, was wrong. Lee’s army had not moved 
as quickly as ours, and his two infantry corps, com¬ 
manded by General A. P. Hill and General Richard 
Ewell, were halted for the night of the 13th in the 
j vicinity of Warrenton. Had General Meade known 
the position of General Lee’s infantry on the night 
jof the 13th, and been correctly informed before 
midday of the 14th of the character of Hill’s move¬ 
file pike and through Thoroughfare Gap, if we delayed on Broad 
Run. For that reason, the proposition was not adopted. It would 
have been fortunate for Meade if he had adopted it. Both leaders 
/would then have had what they sought—a general engagement. 





22 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


ment on the pike, he could have disposed his army 
on the 14th so as to assemble it on Broad Run, 
near Bristoe Station, and attack Hill’s corps before 
Ewell’s arrived there, as we shall presently see ; and 
then have directed his whole force on Ewell. As it 
was, Lee was equally ignorant of the disposition 
and movement of our army, and failed in securing 
the simultaneous arrival of his two corps at Bristoe 
Station. 

General Lee states that early on the 14th of Octo¬ 
ber a portion of his army [Hill’s corps and some 
cavalry] moved by way of New Baltimore toward 
Bristoe Station, and the rest [Ewell’s corps], W- 
companied by the main body of the cavalry, pro¬ 
ceeded to the same point by Auburn Mills and 
Greenwich. On the evening of the 13th General 
Stuart, with a brigade of Confederate cavalry, found 
himself in the midst of our troops of the Second 
Corps and Gregg’s cavalry, and remained concealed 
all night in a dense thicket of old-field pine along 
the road from Auburn to Catlett’s. He managed, 
during the night, to communicate his situation and 
the position of our troops there to General Lee. 
Just before daylight Caldwell’s division, with its 
artillery facing in the direction of Warrenton, made 
fires, which disclosed their exact position to Gen¬ 
eral Stuart, who opened upon their rear with his 
battery of artillery at short distance; and imme¬ 
diately the enemy’s main cavalry force, coming from 
the direction of Warrenton, attacked Gregg’s cav-t 
airy division on the south side of Cedar Run an! 
attack met successfully by Gregg and Kilpatrick. 


CENTREVILLE MOVEMENT. 23 

Caldwell faced about, and Rickett’s battery opened 
upon Stuart. At the same time, General Alexander 
Hays, commanding^ the second division, promptly 
detached two regiments^to attack Stuart’s cavalry, 
which was handsomely done; Colonel Thomas Ruf¬ 
fin, charging furiously upon these regiments, was 
mortally wounded. General Stuart escaped from 
his entanglement, and Ewell’s corps now approach¬ 
ing, General Caldwell’s division resumed its former 
facing, its artillery opening upon Ewell. General 
Hays and General Webb (commanding the second 
and third divisions), with the train, moved accord¬ 
ing to the order of march toward Catlett’s, while 
General Caldwell kept the enemy in check, retiring 
when the road was clear, the enemy at first advanc¬ 
ing with lines of battle, but in a short time moving 
off to the left on the road to Greenwich. General 
Gregg’s division had been incessantly skirmishing 
with the enemy from daylight, and united with 
Caldwell’s division in covering the rear. En route 
to Bristoe Station, Webb’s division led on the 
north-west side of the railroad, Hays’s division fol¬ 
lowed on the south-east side, Caldwell’s division 
brought up the rear, and Gregg’s cavalry covered 
the left flank. Every precaution was taken to move 
the troops in a proper disposition for battle. 

At midday, when General Meade reached Bristoe 
Station, General Sykes, with the Fifth Corps, had 
crossed Broad Run, above the railroad bridge. The 
Second Corps was to cross below the bridge. As it 
was expected that some force of the enemy would 
make its appearance at Bristoe, coming from Green- 



24 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


wich, on the road the Third Corps had taken, or 
from Gainesville, General Sykes was now directed 
not to move until the Second Corps came up, and 
orders were sent to the Third Corps (next in ad¬ 
vance of the Fifth) to halt until the Fifth Corps 
began to move. By this arrangement it was ex¬ 
pected to have three corps available, if required, to 
meet any force of the enemy that might be encount¬ 
ered here. General Warren was advised of these 
instructions, and was also informed that General 
Kilpatrick, at Buckland’s Mills (on the Warrenton 
pike, where Broad Run crosses it), reported that 
the enemy’s infantry were on the Warrenton pike 
at that place, and also that Kilpatrick would leave 
there at twelve o’clock. General Warren was di¬ 
rected to move as rapidly as possible, as the enemy 
would probably send a column to Bristoe. 

But as soon as the head of the Second Corps came 
in sight, General Sykes set his corps in motion, and 
the Third Corps began at the .same time to move 
forward. 

General A. P. FI ill, leaving his camp near War¬ 
renton at five o’clock in the morning, moved on the 
Warrenton pike to Broad Run Church (New Balti¬ 
more), and then took the road by Greenwich to 
Bristoe Station, with Heth’s and Wilcox’s divisions, 
sending Anderson’s division on the pike to Buck- 
land Mills, as he had received information from 
several sources that a portion of our army was 
moving there from Greenwich. Anderson, finding 
only our cavalry at Buckland Mills, and General i 
Fitzhugh Lee with his cavalry having come up, re- ! 



ACTION OF BRISTOE STATION. 


25 



joined Hill at Greenwich, following Heth’s division, 
which led. Wilcox’s division brought up the rear, 
detaching Scales’s brigade and a battery to guard 
the train at Buckland Mills. Upon reaching the 
hills near Bristoe, overlooking the plain on the 
north side of Broad Run, the rear of Sykes’s Fifth 
Corps was discovered about moving off. Poague’s 
artillery was put in position, and opened upon 
them; and Heth’s division was formed in line of 
battle and directed to cross the run and press 
them ; but before it could do so, the head of Warren’s 
Second Corps, Webb’s division, appeared, issuing 
from the woods along the railroad near Broad Run, 
and Heth’s division was directed against that; An¬ 
derson’s division now beginning to come up, at half¬ 
past two was formed on the right of Heth. 

General Webb says that at two o’clock two bri¬ 
gades of his division (the other brigade being de¬ 
tached with the train) debouched from the woods 
close to Broad Run, and found artillery of the 
eremy in position on their left flank, a force of in¬ 
fantry preceded by skirmishers coming down on the 
same flank, and a line of battle of the enemy, 
Walker’s brigade of Heth’s division, apparently 
following the rear of the P'ifth Corps, which was 
just disappearing in the wood beyond Broad Run. 
As the Second Corps was to cross Broad Run below 
the railroad bridge, Webb’s division had crossed to 
the south side of the road. General Hays’s di¬ 
vision was following Webb’s closely. General War¬ 
ren had just arrived at Bristoe. With the utmost 
promptitude the two divisions were faced to the 
2 




26 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


left into line of battle, and ran forward under the 
fire of the enemy to the railroad embankment and 
cut, both forming excellent intrenchments. Webb’s 
right rested on a commanding hill near Broad Run, 
which had been intrenched in the summer to pro¬ 
tect the railroad bridge. The artillery, at a gallop, 
took up commanding positions in rear of the infant¬ 
ry, and opened on the enemy—Brown’s battery on 
the north side of Broad Run, without support, Rick¬ 
etts’ on the south side. The leading troops of 
Heth’s division, Cooke’s and Kirkland’s brigades, 
attacked at once with a strong line of battle, pre¬ 
ceded by a very strong skirmish line, and charged 
up to the railroad. The flankers of General Webb’s 
division were the first encountered, and they suf¬ 
fered heavily. The attack fell mainly upon the 
first and third brigades of General Webb’s division, 
commanded respectively by Colonel Heath and 
Colonel Mallon—the latter killed in the action ; and 
on the third brigade of General Hays’s division, 
commanded by General Owen. Brown’s battery 
enfiladed the enemy’s line when it attacked. Under 
the fire of this force, and the artillery supporting 
it, the enemy was soon repulsed, and 450 prisoners, 
two stands of colors, and five pieces of artillery 
were captured. Generals Cooke and Kirkland were 
wounded. 

General Heth states that this contest was over 
before General Walker’s and General Davis’s bri¬ 
gades could be brought into action, though they 
were formed to cover the right and left flanks. 

While Cooke and Kirkland were engaged, Posey’s 



ACTION OF BRISTOE STATION. 


27 


and Perry’s brigades of Anderson’s division advanced 
against the left of Hays’s division, but without en¬ 
gaging it heavily; and Anderson being notified that 
Ewell’s corps was coming up on his right, formed 
his other brigade to connect with it; then Posey’s 
and Perry’s brigades advanced against the skirmish¬ 
ers of Hays’s, and perhaps Caldwell’s, division, to 
enable General Long to put some artillery in posi¬ 
tion. 

General Caldwell was near Kettle Run, about a 
mile and a half from Bristoe, when the firing be¬ 
gan, and moved up at double-quick. His division 
was formed along the railroad, on the left of Hays, 
Miles’s brigade being sent to support Brown’s and 
Ricketts’ batteries. 

Gregg, at Catlett’s, hearing the firing at Bristoe, 
moved up promptly to the scene of action, and 
formed on the left; afterward he was held in 
reserve. 

About four o’clock in the afternoon the enemy 
threatened another attack, forming a line of battle 
in front of Webb and Hays, but the artillery fire 
caused it to be abandoned. Late in the afternoon 
a heavy column moved to the left of Caldwell and 
partly crossed the railroad track, but did not attack. 

It is inferred from General Anderson’s statement 
respecting Ewell’s corps, that it arrived before four 
o’clock, and skirmishing continued along Warren’s 
left during the arrival and deployment of that 
corps ; at dusk some batteries opened against War¬ 
ren’s left, replied to by his own, but the artillery 
fire ceased soon after dark. At dusk the head of 


28 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


General Sykes’s force came to the support of the 
Second Corps, General Warren having urgently re¬ 
quested it. As soon as General Meade received in¬ 
telligence of the enemy’s appearance at Bristoe, 
and that the Fifth and Third Corps were not in 
connection with the Second, those corps were or¬ 
dered back to its support. It was too late, how¬ 
ever, to concentrate the whole army there in time 
for a general engagement. 

General Hill does not state when Wilcox’s divis¬ 
ion came up, but as he followed immediately after 
Anderson, who was upon the ground at half-past 
two, Wilcox’s division must have arrived not 
later than half-past three. All that Hill says bear¬ 
ing upon this is : “ Dark came upon us before new 

dispositions could be made to attack, and during 
the night the enemy retreated.” 

General Lee does not state when General Ewell’s 
force arrived, but in referring to the repulse of 
Hill’s attack adds: “ Before the rest of the troops 
could be brought up, and the position of the enemy 
ascertained, he retreated across Broad Run.” It 
appears from General Anderson’s report that he 
was notified of Ewell’s near approach not long after 
the repulse of Cooke’s and Kirkland’s brigades. At 
Greenwich, Ewell gave up the road to Hill, and 
moved across the country through fields and woods, 
or by obscure farm-roads, as it was a section of 
country well known to him, or to those with him. 
But it was found difficult for artillery, and caused 
serious delay. Yet the whole of Ewell’s corps must 
have arrived while daylight lasted, as additional 





ACTION OF BRISTOE STATION. 


2 9 


troops of the enemy were observed to come up and 
take position opposite Warren’s left, and prisoners 
taken said these were Ewell’s troops. Their march 
was not longer than that of the Second Corps. The 
march of Hill’s corps was only three or four miles 
longer than that of the Second Corps, and was on 
a good and unobstructed road. The Second Corps, 
on the contrary, waS delayed in the morning by the 
encounter with Ewell’s troops and the cavalry at 
Auburn. 

The numerical strength of the Second Corps, 
according to the return of the 10th of October, was 
8,243 enlisted men of infantry present for duty. 
At Bristoe, two brigades were detached with the 
train, and General Warren states that his force on 
the field at the time of the engagement, was about 
3,000 infantry, and three batteries of artillery. The 
strength of Hill’s corps by the return of the 
Army of Northern Virginia of September 30, was 
1^,073 enlisted men of infantry present for duty, 
but this does not include Cooke’s brigade, which 
was separately returned at that date, and which 
had 2,150 enlisted men. This would make the 
strength of the three divisions of Hill’s corps, 
17,223 enlisted men. Ewell’s corps by the same 
return had about 15,000 enlisted men present for 
duty. 

It is apparent from this statement that General 
Warren had before him a greatly superior force of 
the enemy—a fact of which he was well aware—and 
that he could not withdraw securely in daylight in 
the presence of such a force. He says that his 


30 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


position was good, except on the left, and such that 
the enemy could not ascertain what force he had 
unless they made a heavy attack. 

At nine o’clock in the evening General War¬ 
ren crossed Broad Run, taking with him his 
wounded and his captures, and, marching all 
night, crossed Bull Run at Blackburn’s Ford at 
4 A.M. of the 15th, having ill the course of the 
twenty-four hours twice successfully encountered 
the enemy in superior force, and marched over 
twenty-five miles. 

The handling of the Second Corps in this opera¬ 
tion, and the promptitude, skill, and spirit with 
which the enemy were met, were admirable, and 
might form an excellent model for the conduct of 
a rear guard. 

The loss of the corps at Auburn and Bristoe 
was thirty officers and 403 enlisted men killed and 
wounded. The Confederate loss in both actions 
was 782 officers and enlisted men killed and 
wounded. [Medical and Surgical History of the 
War.\ Generals Cooke, Kirkland, and Posey, of 
Hill’s corps, were wounded at Bristoe. 

The losses of Buford’s and Gregg’s cavalry divis¬ 
ions in the movements from the Rapidan to Centre- 
ville were 335 officers and enlisted men killed and 
wounded, and 478 missing; Gregg’s missing being 
432. Of those reported missing from his divis¬ 
ion at Sulphur Springs, many were killed and 
wounded.* 


* The 1st Maine, Colonel Smith commanding, detached at Sul¬ 
phur Springs on the morning of the 12th, to Sperryville and Little 




CENTREVILLE MOVEMENT. 


31 


The casualties of Kilpatrick’s (third) division, 
which were slight, are not given separately for this 
period. 

It will be noticed that in the operations following 
midday of the 10th, most of the troops were march¬ 
ing during the night of the 10th, and during the 
nth until night, twenty-eight hours; that they 
were marching during the afternoon, and all night 
of the 12th, and continuously on the 13th, to nine 
or ten o’clock at night—that is, thirty hours. These 
day-and-night marches averaged at least thirty 
miles for each corps. The Third, Fifth, and Second 
Corps, beginning their marches about daylight of 
the 14th, did not complete them until the morning 
of the 15th. This severe marching and loss of rest 
was borne cheerfully by officers and men, all of 
whom responded with alacrity to every call made 
upon them. 

On the 15th of October the army remained in 
position at Centreville, resting; the enemy’s cavalry 
and artillery skirmishing with the Second Corps at 


Washington, returned to General Gregg at Bristoe, after a circuit of 
90 miles, having encountered the enemy’s cavalry and infantry at 
several points in endeavoring to return. 

Lieutenant Harris and twelve men, carrying a despatch to General 
Gregg from Colonel Smith on the 12th, ran into the enemy’s infant¬ 
ry near Amissville, and charged through them ; then met them at 
Jefferson, and returning toward Amissville, ran into Hill’s corps ; 
escaping, he hid his party in a dense pine wood ; succeeded in get¬ 
ting to New Baltimore, and' there running into Mosby’s troops, lost 
two men ; then he ran into two squadrons of White’s command, 
when the party were captured and taken to Sulphur Springs. 
Lieutenant Harris, however, escaped. 



32 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


Blackburn’s Ford, and with the Third Corps at 
Liberty Mills.* 

As it was evident on the 16th that Lee would 
not advance further,f preparations for our advance 
were made, but a severe rain-storm set in that day, 
rendering Bull Run unfordable, and our pontons 


* On the 15th General Meade issued the following order : 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

October 15, 1863. 

The Major-General commanding announces to the Army that the 
rear guard, consisting of the Second Corps, was attacked yesterday 
while marching by the flank. The enemy after a spirited contest 
was repulsed, losing a battery of five guns, two colors, and four 
hundred and fifty prisoners. 

The skill and promptitude of Major-General Warren, and the 
gallantry and bearing of the officers and soldiers of the Second 
Corps, are entitled to high commendation. 

By command of 

Major-General Meade, 

S. Williams. 

A sst. A djt. - General. 

\ On the morning of the 15th, the day after the affair at Bristoe 
Station General Lee wrote to the Secretary of War at Richmond that, 
after his letter of the 13th instant, his army continued its movement 
with the view of turning the right flank of the enemy, who was 
marching by a number of parallel roads, leading directly toward 
Washington, while it was necessary for them to make considerable 
detours. They were consequently unable to do him any consider¬ 
able damage. It was easy for him to retire under the fortifications 
of Washington and Alexandria, and they would be unable to attack 
him advantageously : that it was impossible for them to remain 
where they were, the country being destitute of supplies, and the 
railroad bridges over the Rappahannock River and the streams 
north of it having been destroyed. 



MEADE ADVANCES. 


33 


were in the rear at Fairfax Station, and the roads 
blocked with supply trains. On the 17th the 
bridge train was ordered up to Blackburn’s Ford, 
but General Sedgwick, on our right, reported the 
enemy’s infantry as well as cavalry to be on the 
Little River pike, near Chantilly—a report that was 
repeated at midnight. This information put a stop 
to our advance, preparations for which were re¬ 
sumed when, by midday of the 18th, the force in 
Sedgwick’s front was reported by him to have 
withdrawn. 

On the 19th the army advanced to Gainesville on 
the Warrenton pike, and to Bristoe Station. Kil¬ 
patrick, in advance on the pike, met the enemy’s 
cavalry at Groveton, which fell back slowly to 
Gainesville. Buford and Gregg guarded the trains. 

Information received from General Kilpatrick in 
the evening indicating that both Ewell’s and Hill’s 
corps were at Warrenton, our army was concen¬ 
trated in the vicinity of Gainesville early on the 
morning of the 20th, and Kilpatrick sent forward 
toward Warrenton at daylight to discover the 
movements of the enemy. Stuart, with Hampton’s 
cavalry division, retired slowly before Kilpatrick on 
the Warrenton pike. At Buckland Mills the pas¬ 
sage of Broad Run was forced by Custer’s brigade. 
Here Kilpatrick halted for an hour, to hear from 
the scouts he had sent toward Greenwich and Au¬ 
burn, and also toward Haymarket. Upon their 
return they reported no enemy on either flank; and 
Davies was ordered to follow the enemy to New 
Baltimore, which he did cautiously, Stuart falling 


34 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


back slowly beyond New Baltimore, as agreed upon 
between himself and General Fitzhugh Lee, who 
was at Greenwich with his cavalry division, waiting 
the opportunity to attack Kilpatrick in flank and 
rear. Kilpatrick remained at Buckland Mills with 
Custer’s brigade, and, by the time Davies reached 
New Baltimore, was informed by scouts of the ad¬ 
vance from Greenwich of Lee’s cavalry, which soon 
after became engaged with Custer’s. Davies was 
at once recalled, and he fell back fighting, closely 
pressed ; for General Stuart, upon hearing Lee’s 
guns, at once attacked him vigorously. Stuart says 
that Davies at first resisted stubbornly, but when 
once broken the rout was complete, and that he 
pursued at full speed to Buckland (about four 
miles). 

Custer recrossed Broad Run at Buckland Mills, 
and endeavored to keep Lee from Davies. Davies 
succeeded in crossing higher up, and moved across 
the country to the Haymarket road, pursued by 
Stuart up to and within the pickets of the First 
Corps, some of whom were captured, owing to the 
disorder caused by our own cavalry suddenly riding 
through them, followed pell-mell by that of the 
enemy. 

Custer fell back to the infantry at Gainesville, 
likewise closely pursued by Fitzhugh Lee, who also 
picked up some prisoners from the infantry picket 
line. 

The whole of the enemy’s cavalry were engaged 
in this affair; their return of October 20 gives 6,867 
as the number of enlisted men present for duty at 



LEE ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 


35 


that date. Kilpatrick’s division, on the return of 
September 30, had 3,500 enlisted men present for 
duty. 

The loss of the cavalry in this affair, according to 
the Medical and Surgical History of the War, as 
taken from the official reports of Generals Meade, 
Stuart and Lee, was twenty killed, sixty wounded, 
and 100 missing in Kilpatrick’s division ; and ten 
killed and forty wounded in Stuart’s cavalry. 

The casualties of our cavalry corps, from the 9th 
to the 23rd of October, were : seventy-three officers 
and enlisted men killed, 312 wounded and 866 
missing, giving an aggregate loss of 1,251. 

General Lee claims to have captured from us in 
these operations, from the 9th to the 23d of Octo¬ 
ber, 2,002 prisoners. Deducting the prisoners taken 
from the cavalry, whose operations rendered them 
peculiarly liable to such loss, and the prisoners 
captured from our pickets, nearly all the remain¬ 
der were stragglers who had fallen out of the ranks 
from exhaustion on the roads followed by the 
enemy. The Army of the Potomac had received a 
good many conscripts a short time before the 10th 
of October, and many of them were probably un¬ 
equal to the strain put upon them. 

On the 21st of October Meade moved toward 
Warrenton, and finding that Lee had recrossed the 
Rappahannock, took up a position covering the 
Warrenton pike and the Orange and Alexandria 
Railroad, the cavalry watching the fords of the 
river. Lee had destroyed the railroad from Bristoe 
Station to the Rappahannock River, a distance of 


36 GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 

more than twenty miles, during our enforced delay 
at Centreville, and this had now to be rebuilt. 
Colonel McCallum, Superintendent of Military 
Railroads, had completed it as far as Warrenton 
Junction, one-half the distance, by November 2d. 

Respecting the operation that has just been de¬ 
scribed, beginning on the 9th of October, it may be 
remarked that, so long as the enemy’s movement 
and its object were undeveloped, the Army of the 
Potomac should have remained quiet, or have been 
concentrated at or near its central point, Culpeper 
Court House, except such parts of it as were neces¬ 
sary to make the enemy show his hand. 

Arresting the movement toward Warrenton on 
the morning of the 12th of October was also erro¬ 
neous, for if General Lee had moved to Culpeper 
Court House, and had been waiting there on the 
12th, seeking to bring on a general engagement, 
the loss of time on the part of the Army of the 
Potomac, in moving toward him from the vicinity 
of Warrenton, would have delayed it only a day. 
Whereas, if the supposition that Lee was moving 
on the 12th to cross the upper fords of the Rappa¬ 
hannock, on the roads leading to Warrenton, were 
correct, as it actually proved to be, the return to 
Culpeper Court House would place the Army of 
the Potomac in such a position that it would lose 
the opportunity which it had sought. In fact, that 
movement back to Culpeper Court House obliged 
the Army of the Potomac finally to go to Centre¬ 
ville. 

When the railroad was completed as far as War- 


LEE HOLDS THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 


37 


renton Junction, General Meade proposed to Gen¬ 
eral Halleck, General-in-Chief, to make a rapid 
movement to the heights of Fredericksburg, and 
transfer his base of operations to the Fredericks¬ 
burg Railroad, believing that General Lee had 
counted upon a long delay in any further opera¬ 
tions on our part, from the necessity we were 
under of rebuilding the Alexandria Railroad, which 
involved the construction of several bridges. In¬ 
deed, information reached General Meade that 
General Lee’s troops were engaged in • building 
huts, as though they expected to winter between 
the Rappahannock and the Rapidan—a rumor sub¬ 
sequently confirmed. But General Meade’s proj¬ 
ect was disapproved ; and he was informed that^ 
while he had full authority to make any tactical 
movement he chose, no change of base or line of 
communication would be approved. 

By the 6th of November the Army of the Poto¬ 
mac was fully supplied, and on the morning of the 
7th moved to cross the Rappahannock. 

General Lee states that after the return of his 
army to the Rappahannock, it was disposed on 
both sides of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, 
General Ewell’s corps on the right, General Hill’s 
corps on the left, with the cavalry on each flank. 
The troops were placed as near the river as suit¬ 
able ground for encampment could be found, and 
most of the artillery was sent to the nearest point 
in the rear, where the animals could be readily 
foraged. 

It was deemed advantageous, he says, to main- 


38 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


tain communication with the north bank, in order 
to threaten any flank movement the enemy might 
make above or below, and thus compel him to 
divide his forces, when, it was hoped, an oppor¬ 
tunity would be presented to concentrate cm one 
or the other part. For this purpose, he continues, 
a point was selected a short distance above the site 
of the railroad bridge, where the hills on each side 
of the river afforded protection to his ponton 
bridge, and increased the means of defence. Small 
earthworks, constructed on these hills by the Army 
of the Potomac to repel an attack from the south, 
were remodelled; those on the north bank being 
converted into a tete depont , and a line of trenches 
extended from it along the crest, on the right and 
left, to the river-bank above and below. The works 
on the south side were also remodelled, and sunken 
batteries for additional guns constructed; and east 
of the railroad sunken batteries for two guns and 
rifle pits were arranged to command the east side 
of the railroad embankment on the north bank, 
under cover of which an attacking force might 
advance upon the tete de pont. He adds that these 
works were slight, but were deemed adequate to 
accomplish the object for which they were in¬ 
tended, and the ponton bridge was considered a 
sufficient means of communication, as, in the event 
of the troops north of the river being compelled to 
withdraw, their crossing could be covered by the 
artillery and infantry in the works on the south 
side. Four pieces of artillery were placed in the 
tete depont y and eight other in the works on the 


MEADE ADVANCES. 


39 


south bank. A dam was built across the river 
below the works, making a deep pool along their 
length. The defence of this position was intrusted 
to Lieutenant-General Ewell’s corps; and the troops 
of Johnson’s and Early’s divisions guarded the 
works alternately, Rodes’s division being stationed 
near Kelly’s Ford. General Early’s division re¬ 
lieved General Johnson’s on the morning of the 
6th of November, Hays’s brigade taking charge of 
the works. General Early criticises the works on 
the north side of the river, which were, indeed, de¬ 
fective in the particulars he mentions, though he 
says the position was susceptible of being made 
very strong. 

General Wright, temporarily commanding the 
Sixth Corps, when the works were assaulted by 
that corps, says that it was a strong natural posi¬ 
tion, fortified with much labor and care. 

Lieutenant-General Ewell says: “I had paid fre¬ 
quent visits to the works at the tete de pont, where 
much labor had been bestowed.” He also differed 
from General Early as to the necessity for more 
artillery in the tete depont . 

The general character and extent of the defences 
prepared at Rappahannock Station had been ascer¬ 
tained by General Meade, as well as of those at 
Kelly’s Ford and elsewhere at the river crossings. 

On the evening of the 6th of November Major- 
General Sedgwick was placed in command of the 
right column, composed of the Fifth and Sixth 
Corps, then in the vicinity of Warrenton, and 
directed to move at daylight of the yth to Rap- 


40 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


pahannock Station, drive the enemy from his posi¬ 
tions on both banks of the river at that place, cross, 
and advance toward Brandy Station. In addition 
to the corps artillery, ten siege guns were assigned 
to the column. 

Major-General French was placed in command 
of the First, Second, and Third Corps, then on the 
Warrenton Railroad, and in the vicinity of War- 
renton Junction, and directed to move at daylight 
to Kelly’s Ford, which is four or five miles below 
Rappahannock Station, effect a crossing up the 
river there, make a lodgment on the heights over¬ 
looking the crossing, and then, moving toward the 
enemy’s rear at Rappahannock Station, assist the 
operations of the right column, under General 
Sedgwick, in dislodging the enemy at that point. 
That accomplished, he was to advance with the right 
column toward Brandy Station. 

General Buford was directed to cross the Rap¬ 
pahannock at the upper fords and Hazel River at 
Rixeyville: General Kilpatrick to cross at the 
fords below Kelly’s: Gregg’s division to guard the 
trains at Bealeton. 

The head of the right column, Sedgwick’s, ar¬ 
rived within a mile and a half of the river at mid¬ 
day and formed two lines of battle, the left of the 
Sixth and the right of the Fifth Corps resting on 
the railroad. Skirmishers were pushed forward 
and the enemy’s position and defences carefully 
examined. 

The head of the left column, French’s, arrived 
near Kelly’s Ford at midday, unexpectedly to the 


MEADE CARRIES LEE’S WORKS. 


41 


enemy on the south side of the river, who at once 
reinforced their rifle trenches, and resisted the 
crossing with artillery and infantry in their in- 
trenchments. General French’s batteries opened 
at half-past twelve, and a brigade effected a lodg¬ 
ment on the south side at half-past one, capturing 
many prisoners in the rifle trench. At two o’clock 
the leading division had crossed, the water being 
waist-deep, and the laying of the ponton bridges 
was begun. The greater part of the command 
crossed that night. 

As the ground on the north bank commands that 
on the south bank at Kelly’s Ford, only such prep¬ 
aration for resistance had been made there by the 
enemy as would allow the division holding the 
crossing time to get into a position selected in 
rear of the ford, with a view to contest the advance 
of any large force after crossing. General Rodes 
placed his division in this position, its left resting 
in woods on the river. As soon as General Lee 
learned what was transpiring, General Johnson’s 
division was ordered to reinforce General Rodes, 
which it did about dark, forming on his right and 
extending to Mountain Run; for General Lee 
believed that the force in front of Rappahannock 
Station could be kept in check, and that he would 
be able to concentrate upon the other at Kelly’s 
Ford. 

The casualties of French’s column, as taken 
from the official reports, were: seventy killed and 
wounded; of Rodes’s division, five killed, fifty-nine 
wounded, and 295 missing; but General French 


42 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


states that over forty of the enemy’s dead were 
buried by one of his divisions. 

When General Sedgwick displayed his force in 
front of the position at Rappahannock Station, 
General Lee ordered Hill’s corps to be in readiness. 
Anderson’s division was advanced to the river on 
the left of the railroad, and the artillery was ordered 
to the front. General Early had at once moved 
his division close up to the ponton bridge, and sent 
Hoke’s brigade, under Colonel Godwin, to reinforce 
General Hays on the north bank. No other troops 
were sent over, as the two brigades were sufficient 
to man the works completely, and the nature of 
the position was such that an attack upon them 
could not be made with a front more extended 
than their own. The remainder of Early’s division 
was placed in support, one regiment being sta¬ 
tioned in the rifle-trenches on the east side of the 
railroad to sweep the approach along the railroad 
embankment on the north side; the attempt to 
place a gun in the pits prepared for the same pur¬ 
pose was abandoned, as the skirmish line of the 
Fifth Corps was already in possession of the river- 
bank opposite this point. 

As soon as the enemy’s position in front of 
Sedgwick’s column had been sufficiently examined, 
the plan of attack was formed. The Fifth Corps 
was to get possession of the river-bank on the left, 
the Sixth Corps on the right, in order to establish 
their artillery on a range of high ground in front 
of the enemy’s position and endeavor to drive him 
from his works by that fire. 


MEADE CARRIES LEE’S WORKS. 


43 


The skirmishers of the Fifth Corps, under General 
Garrard, advanced about three o’clock, followed by 
the first division, under General Bartlett, and held 
the river bank from Norman’s Ford close up to the 
redoubt, and kept up a fire upon its artillery. Two 
rifle batteries were established on the left by the 
Fifth Corps at effective range on the high ground 
from which the enemy’s skirmishers had been 
driven, and opened upon the enemy. General 
Howe, commanding the Second Division of the 
Sixth Corps, drove the enemy’s skirmishers from 
the high ground on the right, established batteries 
there, and opened upon the works. General 
Tyler, commanding artillery reserve, added six 
of the 20-pounders to them. But all this artillery 
fire, though kept up until dusk, did not silence the 
enemy’s nor compel the force in the works to with¬ 
draw from them. During this time the lines of 
battle advanced nearer. 

An assault just after dusk was now determined 
upon. The redoubts and rifle trench would cover 
the assaulting troops from the artillery fire on 
the south bank. Our artillery on the right and 
left were to keep up a hot fire until the assaulting 
troops, advancing in the sector between the two 
lines of artillery fire, reached the works. General 
David A. Russell, temporarily commanding the First 
Division, General Wright being in command of the 
Sixth Corps, led the assault in person, with parts of 
the Third and Second brigades of his division, com¬ 
manded respectively by Colonel Ellmaker and 
Colonel Upton. 


44 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


The assault was gallantly made, and its success 
was complete. The redoubts, with connecting 
rifle-pits, four pieces of artillery with their caissons 
and ammunition, 103 commissioned officers, i,2CO 
enlisted men, 1,225 stands of small arms, and seven 
battle-flags were captured. The 5th Wisconsin and 
the 6th Maine of the Third Brigade formed the 
storming party, and carried the works. The 49th 
and the 119th Pennsylvania of the Third Brigade 
supported them, and aided in holding the works 
after they were carried. The 5th Maine and the 
121st New York, of Upton’s brigade, the Second, 
carried the rifle-pits on our right most gallantly, 
and took a large number of prisoners. The 95th 
and the 96th Pennsylvania, of Upton’s brigade, 
held the ponton bridge and guarded the prisoners. 
The 121 st New York and the 20th Maine, of the 
Fifth Corps, on picket duty, joined in the assault, 
led by Captains Fish and Merrill, and captured one 
flag, eight officers and seventy-eight enlisted men. 

General Sedgwick commended particularly the 
conduct of General Russell, Colonels Upton and 
Ellmaker, and the 5th Wisconsin and the 6th Maine, 
and called attention to the fact that the enemy’s 
intrenchments were defended by a force numerically 
equal to the attacking force. 

General Wright, temporarily commanding the 
Sixth Corps, in his rep’ort, says that this was the 
first case during the war of an intrenched position 
of importance being carried on the first assault. 

General Russell in his report gives great credit 
to the officers and men of the Third and Second 


MEADE CARRIES LEE’S WORKS. 


45 


brigades. He states that the number of the Third 
Brigade engaged was 1,549, and of the Second Bri¬ 
gade, 568. The casualties in his command were : In 
the Third Brigade, six officers and fifty-two enlisted 
men killed, twenty-three officers and 182 enlisted 
men wounded, and two enlisted men missing—total, 
Third Brigade, 263 officers and enlisted men killed 
and wounded. In the Second Brigade, two officers 
and nine enlisted men killed, three officers and 
forty-nine enlisted men wounded—total Second 
Brigade sixty-three officers and enlisted men killed 
and wounded; total for the division, 336 killed and 
wounded and two missing. The loss of the picket 
men of the Fifth Corps that joined in the assault 
was twenty-nine killed and wounded and four miss¬ 
ing. General Early reported his casualties, including 
the artillery in the tete dc p 07 it , at six enlisted men 
killed, three officers and thirty-two enlisted men 
wounded, 119 officers and 1,512 enlisted men miss¬ 
ing. Those reported killed, he states, were known 
to be killed, and the wounded were those who were 
brought off, some wounded while escaping. Among 
the missing were, doubtless, he adds, a number of 
killed and wounded. His total loss of killed, 
wounded and missing was, therefore, 1,672 officers 
and enlisted men. He says that nearly 300 of Hays’s 
men present at the action made their escape, and 
between 100 and 150 of Hoke’s. Some of these 
managed to escape in the darkness of the night 
after they were captured. These, added to the num¬ 
ber of enlisted men killed, wounded, and missing, 
make the number present in the works 1,950. 


46 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


General Russell states that the number of his 
troops engaged—that is, the number that captured 
the works and held them—was 2,117. His report is 
a brief, clear statement. He was a man of high 
character, an educated soldier, careful and exact in 
his statements. 

The assault was a complete surprise, and its suc¬ 
cess perfect, the whole affair being the work of 
only a few minutes. 

General Early was on one of the hills on the 
south side of the river watching, with General Lee, 
until dark, what was going on. When the artillery 
fire ceased they had noted musketry fire from and 
in front of the rifle-trenches, but could not hear it 
because of a strong southerly wind blowing; and 
General Lee left the hill with the remark that Sedg¬ 
wick’s movement was, in his opinion, a feint, and 
that it was too late for anything serious that night. 
General Early confesses that he felt considerable 
anxiety for the result of a night attack, if his op¬ 
ponent should have the enterprise to make it, yet 
the confident opinion of his Commanding General 
relieved his fears. Presently, however, one of his 
staff officers, who had been sent across the river to 
General Hays and Colonel Godwin with messages, 
returned after seeing those officers, and informed 
General Early that when he left General Hays the 
enemy were advancing against him ; that he had 
then gone to Colonel Godwin, holding the rifle- 
trenches on their left, and that in returning across 
the bridge he had met some of Hays’s men, who 
told him that Hays had been driven from the 


LEE RECROSSES THE RAPIDAN. 


47 


trenches. This General Early did not credit, but 
at once ordered Pegram’s brigade to the bridge, 
and the artillery to be ready ; and then, going to 
the bridge, he found that the greater part of Hays’s 
brigade had been captured, General Hays escaping 
by his horse taking fright after he had been made 
a prisoner. Pie also learned that Hoke’s brigade, 
under Colonel Godwin, had been cut off, and that 
two regiments of Upton’s brigade were in posses¬ 
sion of the north end of the bridge. Pegram’s bri¬ 
gade was so disposed as to resist a crossing of the 
bridge; Gordon’s brigade was ordered up, and a 
message sent to General Lee. General Early found, 
however, that he could do nothing to retrieve the 
disaster, and the ponton bridge was set on fire, and 
so far burned before his troops were drawn off as 
to prevent all crossing.* 

Upon losing this position, General Lee aban¬ 
doned the design of attacking the force that had 
crossed at Kelly’s Ford, and fell back during the 
night to Mountain Run. That position, however, 
was not regarded by him as favorable, and he with¬ 
drew during the night of the 8th to his former posi¬ 
tion south of the Rapidan. 

A heavy fog on the morning of the 8th prevented 
General Sedgwick from ascertaining whether the 
enemy had evacuated the south bank, and the col¬ 
umn at Kelly’s Ford was moved up to the railroad 
to secure the crossing at Rappahannock Station ; 
the Fifth Corps moved at 4 A. M. to Kelly’s Ford, 
and crossed there. By the time the fog cleared 


* See General Early’s Report. 



48 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPID AN. 


Sedgwick had established a ponton bridge, and the 
army moved in pursuit to Brandy Station, the cav¬ 
alry on the right proceeding to Culpeper Court 
House and that on the left through Paoli Mills, on 
Mountain Run, toward Stevensburg ; Lee having 
recrossed the Rapidan. 

A position was taken up by Meade from Kelly’s 
Ford through Brandy Station to Wellford’s Ford on 
Hazel River, and the rebuilding of the Orange 
Railroad to the Rappahannock River was resumed.* 

* On the gth of November General Meade issued the following 
general order to his army : 

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
November 9, 1863. 

General Orders) 

No. 101. ) 

The Commanding General congratulates the army on the recent 
successful passage of the Rappahannock in the face of the enemy, 
compelling him to withdraw to his intrenchments behind the Rapidan. 

To Major-General Sedgwick, and the officers and men of the Fifth 
and Sixth Corps participating in the attack, particularly to the storm¬ 
ing party under Brigadier-General Russell, his thanks are due for 
the gallantry displayed in the assault on the enemy’s intrenched 
position at Rappahannock Station, resulting in the capture of fouf 
guns, two thousand small arms, eight battle flags, one bi'idge train, 
and sixteen hundred prisoners. 

To Major-General French, and the officers and men of the Third 
Corps engaged, particularly to the leading column commanded by 
Colonel De Trobriand, his thanks afedue for the gallantry displayed 
in the crossing at Kelly’s Ford, and seizure of the enemy’s intrench¬ 
ments, and the capture of over four hundred prisoners. 

The Commanding General takes great pleasure in announcing to 
the army that the President has expressed his satisfaction with its 
recent operations. By command of 

Major-General Meade. 

S. Williams, 

A sst. A djt. - Gen . 



CHAPTER III. 


General Meade Crosses the Rapidan, expecting to surprise General 
Lee, and encounter his Forces in detail—The plan is frustrated 
by the failure of the Third Corps to unite with the Second 
and Sixth Corps on the morning of the second day at Robert¬ 
son’s Tavern—Meade Advances to Mine Run, makes disposi¬ 
tions to attack Lee ; but finding him too strongly posted and 
intrenched, withdraws to his former position on the Rapidan. 

As soon as the railroad was completed to the 
Rappahannock River, and the army supplied, ar¬ 
rangements were made for an advance. The enemy 
occupied his intrenchments along the Rapidan from 
Barnett’s Ford, about five miles above the railroad 
crossing of the Rapidan, down to Morton’s Ford, a 
total distance of eighteen or twenty miles. The 
fords below his intrenchments as far as Ely’s Ford 
(ten miles below Morton’s), and above them as far 
as Liberty Mills (five miles above Barnett’s) were 
watched by his cavalry, the latter fords having 
been intrenched after Buford’s reconnoissance in 
September. To protect his right flank, General 
Lee had constructed an intrenched line from a 
point on the river between Raccoon Ford and 
Morton’s Ford to the vicinity of Bartlett’s Mill on 
Mine Run. Bartlett’s Mill is on the road from 
Raccoon Ford to Robertson’s Tavern, and between 
four and five miles distant from each. Robertson’s 
Tavern, sometimes called Locust Grove, is on the 

3 49 


50 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


turnpike from Fredericksburg to Orange Court 
House, and about sixteen miles from the latter 
place. 

Ewell’s corps of three divisions, 15,650 enlisted 
men of infantry present for duty, held the intrench- 
ments from near Bartlett’s Mill to Robertson’s 
Ford ; and Hill’s corps of three divisions, 17,500 en¬ 
listed men of infantry present for duty, held from 
Robertson’s Fo,rd up to Barnett’s Ford, each corps 
holding about nine miles of the river. An attack 
of these intrenchments in front, when well manned, 
had long been deemed impracticable. Lee’s left 
flank was at least twice as far from the Army of the 
Potomac as his right flank. After examination of 
the subject, General Meade decided by a prompt 
movement to cross the lower fords nearest to 
General Lee’s right in three columns, and, concen¬ 
trating two of the columns at Robertson’s Tavern, 
advance rapidly with the whole army by the turn¬ 
pike and the plank-road toward Orange Court 
House; expecting to fall upon Ewell’s corps before 
Hill’s could unite with it, and before Lee could 
take position upon ground which he might have 
already selected and prepared. The plan promised 
brilliant success; to insure it required prompt, 
vigorous action, and intelligent compliance with 
the programme on the part of corps and other 
subordinate commanders. In accordance with this 
plan, orders were issued on the 23d of November for 
the movement on the 24th; but a heavy rain-storm 
set in that day, and the movement was postponed 
to the morning of the 26th. 


MEADE CROSSES THE RAPIDAN. 


51 


When the plan and orders were prepared, the 
corps commanders were invited to headquarters, 
where full explanations of the project were given, 
and copies of maps or sketches, with the routes of 
the different corps marked on them, were distributed 
with verbal descriptions and explanations. The 
Third and Sixth Corps, the Third Corps leading, 
were to cross at Jacob’s Ford, about four miles below 
the right of Lee’s intrenchments, and move to 
Robertson’s Tavern, seven or eight miles distant, by 
wood-roads, the existence and character of which 
had been ascertained, by careful inquiry, with suffi¬ 
cient accuracy to be used in such an operation, 
though not with the detail of an actual reconnois- 
sance. The names of the occupants of the few 
houses to be met on the road and its branches were 
given, and General French was cautioned to take 
the left hand road at a certain Morris’s, half-way to 
the tavern, where the road forks, as the left hand 
road led to Robertson’s Tavern, entering the 
Raccoon Ford road, half a mile from the tavern. It 
was expected that a part of the enemy would move 
from the river by the Raccoon Ford road, and if 
encountered there, might delay the concentration 
at Robertson’s Tavern. The right-hand fork at 
Morris’s led direct to the Raccoon Ford road, enter¬ 
ing it about two miles from Bartlett’s Mill, and 
about three from Robertson’s Tavern. The country 
between Jacob’s Ford and the turnpike was difficult 
to move and manoeuvre in, being covered with a 
dense growth of timber and tangled undergrowth, 
with only a small clearing here and there. 


52 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


The Second Corps was to cross at Germanna 
Ford, and move to Robertson’s Tavern. 

By the plan as originally prepared, the Sixth 
Corps was to follow the Second Corps, the route of 
that corps being on good wide roads, whereas that 
from Jacob’s Ford was a narrow wood-road, through 
dense forest. But General Meade, anticipating an 
attempt on the part of the enemy to check the 
heads of columns until he (the enemy) could get 
into position, and looking for this attack first on 
his right flank, which was nearest the enemy, 
finally directed the Sixth Corps to follow the Third 
Corps. 

The Fifth and First Corps, the latter leaving one 
of its divisions to guard the railroad as far as Manas¬ 
sas, were to cross at Culpeper Mine Ford, move to 
the Orange and Alexandria plank-road at Parker’s 
store, and, if practicable, to advance on that road 
as far as New Hope Church, where a road comes 
in from Robertson’s Tavern, about four miles off to 
the right. 

Gregg’s cavalry division was to cross at Ely’s 
Ford and cover the left flank. Kilpatrick’s division, 
Custer commanding, was to guard Morton’s, Rac¬ 
coon, and other fords; and Euford’s division, 
General Merritt commanding, guarded the trains 
of the army assembled at Richardsville, excepting 
certain ammunition and ambulance trains, and medi¬ 
cine and headquarters spring wagons, which always 
accompanied the troops. 

The movement began on the morning of the 26th 
of November, but the passage of the river was delay- 


MEADE CROSSES THE RAPIDAN. 


53 


ed two hours by the non-arrival of the Third Corps, 
for it was necessary that the crossing of the several 
columns should be simultaneous ; further loss of 
time at the river occurred, owing to the bridge 
equipage provided for Jacob’s Ford and Germanna 
Ford being each deficient one ponton. The banks 
of the river on the enemy’s side were over ioo feet 
high and very steep, requiring much labor to make 
them practicable for artillery and wagons. The artil¬ 
lery of the Third and Sixth Corps were obliged on 
that account to cross at Germanna Ford and join 
their corps by an almost impassable road along the 
river bank. 

As a consequence of these delays, the heads of 
columns, instead of reaching the vicinity of Robert¬ 
son’s Tavern by the night of the 26th, had only 
advanced from two to four miles from the river. 

Orders wmre issued for the columns to continue 
the movement the next day, as previously directed : 
the Second Corps to advance on the pike as far as 
Old Verdiersville, about six miles beyond Robert¬ 
son’s Tavern ; the Third and Sixth Corps to close 
up on the Second; the Fifth Corps to move to 
New Verdiersville on the plank-road, about six 
miles beyond New Hope Church; and the First 
Corps to close up on the Fifth ; Gregg’s cavalry 
division to move on the plank-road in advance of 
the infantry. 

Culpeper Mine Ford and Ely’s Ford were 
watched on the 26th by General Rosser’s brigade, 
of Hampton’s cavalry division, and the passage of 
the Rapidan by the several columns of the Army 


54 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


of the Potomac was duly reported to General 
Lee, whose headquarters were at Orange Court 
House. 

But this was not the earliest intelligence he re¬ 
ceived of our movements; for in the morning, as 
soon as the fog cleared, large bodies of troops, with 
trains, were seen by the enemy from their signal 
stations and intrenchments, moving toward the 
lower fords of the Rapidan; and at a later hour 
intelligence was received by General Lee that our 
army had crossed in force at Ely’s, Culpeper 
Mine, Germanna, and Jacob’s fords. The country 
in that direction, General Lee says, was an un¬ 
broken forest, and it could not be discovered 
whether it was the design of General Meade to ad¬ 
vance toward Richmond by Spottsylvania Court 
House, etc., or move up the Rapidan on his (Lee’s) 
right flank. His army was therefore withdrawn 
from its lines during the night of the 26th, and put 
in motion, with the intention of falling upon our 
flank and rear if the first movement was attempted, 
and of giving battle if the second movement was 
essayed. 

General Early, commanding the Second Corps 
(General Ewell being absent, sick), was directed to 
move by the old turnpike and Raccoon Ford roads 
to Locust Grove (Robertson’s Tavern), General Hill 
to move down the plank-road, General Fitzhugh 
Lee’s cavalry division was directed to take charge 
of the intrenchments on the Rapidan, and General 
Hampton’s division to precede the advance of Hill, 
General Stuart accompanying it. 


LEE MOVES AGAINST MEADE. 


55 


Ewell’s corps had been posted in the intrench- 
ments as follows: Johnson’s division on the right, 
from the vicinity of Bartlett’s Mill to Mountain 
Run; Rodes’s division from Mountain Run to Rac¬ 
coon Ford, and Early’s division (General Hays 
commanding) from Raccoon Ford to Robertson’s 
Ford. These divisions were ordered to move at 
daylight of the 27th to Locust Grove (Robertson’s 
Tavern), Johnson by way of Bartlett’s Mill, Rodes 
by a road west of Mine Run to Zoar Church, and 
then by one parallel to the pike, a mile from it; 
and Hays across to the pike at Old Verdiersville, 
and then forward along the pike. Johnson was 
ordered to look out for his left, though it sub¬ 
sequently appeared that General Early was not 
aware that any part of the Army of the Potomac 
was advancing on the road from Jacob’s Ford 
to Robertson’s Tavern until Johnson’s troops were 
fired into. 

General Warren arrived at Robertson’s Tavern 
about ten o’clock in the morning, where his leading 
division, General Hays commanding, encountered 
the leading division of General Early’s corps, Gen¬ 
eral Hays commanding, and forced back his skir¬ 
mish line along the turnpike, while General Webb 
deployed to the right, and encountering Rodes’s 
division, drove his skirmishers back along the Rac¬ 
coon Ford road. In these encounters Lieutenant- 
Colonel Hesser, 72d Pennsylvania, was killed, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Joslin, 15th Massachusetts, was 
wounded. This was about 11:30 A.M. From the 
prisoners taken it was ascertained that Early’s and 


56 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


Rodes’s divisions were in front of the Second 
Corps. 

General Early says that upon coming up with 
his command on the pike he learned that General 
Hays had met our infantry at Locust Grove, and 
that he found his division in position three-fourths 
of a mile from the Grove ; that Rodes had come 
up at the same time as Hays, and had formed on 
his left across the road from Zoar Church and Bart¬ 
lett’s Mill to Locust Grove. The troops of the 
Army of the Potomac, he says, were in possession 
of the Grove in a fine position, in strong force, 
though they were much concealed in thick woods, 
so that he could not ascertain how they were 
posted. Then he ordered a heavy skirmish line 
from Rodes’s division, but could effect nothing, our 
troops having greatly the advantage in position, 
and he concluded that he could not attack except 
under great disadvantages. General Rodes and 
General Hays had come to the same conclusion 
soon after reaching the vicinity of Locust Grove, 
and determined to wait for General Johnson’s divis¬ 
ion to come up before feeling to ascertain where 
to attack with advantage. But between 11 and 
12 o’clock the rear of Johnson’s division, when two 
miles out from Bartlett’s Mills, had been fired into 
by the Third Corps pickets, and General Johnson 
halted his division to meet the attack which this, 
very unexpectedly, threatened.* 


* The numerical strength of the Second Corps of the Army of 
the Potomac was, according to the return of that army on the 30th 



MEADE CONCENTRATING. 


5 7 


At 11 o’clock the Third Corps had not arrived at 
Robertson’s Tavern, though it had to march only 
six or eight miles at most, nor had any communica¬ 
tion been received from General French or from 
General Sedgwick.* * A brief dispatch was now, 
at ii A.M., sent to General French as follows: 
“ General Warren is at Robertson’s Tavern. Con¬ 
siderable force of the enemy in his front. Move 
forward as promptly as possible, and send word 
to General Sedgwick;” and again at 11:15 this: 
“ General Warren has met the enemy in strong 
force (two divisions) at Robertson’s Tavern. Com¬ 
municate this to General Sedgwick, who is to keep 
closed on you. If you cannot unite with General 
Warren by the route you are on, you must move 
through to him by the left. It is highly important 
you should unite with Warren at once.” 

Let us see what had become of the Third Corps. 
On the night of the 26th its leading division, Gen- 

November, 1863, 685 officers and 9,850 enlisted men of infantry- 
present for duty equipped. The numerical strength of the three 
divisions of infantry of Ewell’s corps present for duty equipped, 
according to the return of the Army of Northern Virginia of the 
20th November, 1863, was : Early’s, 404 officers and 4,297 enlisted 
men ; Rodes’s, 527 officers and 6,562 enlisted men ; Johnson’s, 505 
officers and 4,790 enlisted men. 

* It was difficult to communicate with them at first when Gen¬ 
eral Meade arrived near Robertson’s Tavern, as the road through 
the forest leading to them could not be found, the only guide we 
had having been sent to General French. The first despatches 
from and to them were sent by way of the river bank and the Ger- 
manna road, a distance of twelve miles or more. Somewhat later a 
direct road was found by which the despatches were sent. 



/ 


58 GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 

eral Prince commanding, halted at Roche’s farm, 
about two miles from the river, where a road comes 
in from Morton’s Ford. On the morning of the 
27th, the division, after moving a mile, was halted 
at the forks of the road at Morris’s, and the two 
branches were examined. General Prince con¬ 
cluded the left-hand fork was the one to follow, as 
it really was. General French was of the contrary 
opinion, and the corps remained halted. Had the 
column moved promptly by either road, the Third 
Corps, followed closely by the Sixth, would have 
arrived at Robertson’s Tavern at the same hour as 
the Second Corps, and these three corps, consisting 
of 2,344 officers and 37,819 enlisted men of infantry, 
with an ample supply of artillery, would have en¬ 
countered Ewell’s corps, consisting of 1,321 officers 
and 15,650 enlisted men, and at a time when Hill 
was too far off to be available, and when the Fifth 
and First Corps were advancing on the plank road 
to meet him. 

At half-past eleven a despatch was at last re¬ 
ceived from General French, by way of the Ger- 
manna road, dated 9:20 A.M., and saying: “The 
head of my column is near the plank road and wait¬ 
ing for General Warren.” From the bearer of this 
despatch it was ascertained that when he left Gen¬ 
eral French the head of his column was only three 
miles from Jacob’s Ford, and that the Sixth Corps 
had not been able to move at all. The reply to 
General French was: “Your despatch of 9I1. 20m. 
is received. What are you waiting for? No or¬ 
ders have been sent you to wait for General War- 





MEADE CONCENTRATING. 


59 


ren anywhere, upon your route. Robertson’s Tav¬ 
ern is the point where he takes precedence, and he 
is there now engaged with the enemy, who are in 
strong force. He is waiting for you. The Com¬ 
manding General directs that you move forward as 
rapidly as possible to Robertson’s Tavern, where 
your corps is wanted.” 

At a quarter to two P.M., the following dispatch, 
dated a quarter to twelve A.M., was received from 
General French, who was still at Morris’s: “Gen¬ 
eral Prince reports from Captain Ford, command¬ 
ing cavalry (ioo men), that the enemy are throwing 
out a large force of infantry upon my right flank 
upon the Raccoon Ford road. I am making dis¬ 
positions accordingly.” The reply to him was: 
“Your dispatch of a quarter to twelve A.M. is re¬ 
ceived. The Major-General Commanding directs 
that you attack the enemy in your front imme_ 
diately, throwing your left forward so as to con¬ 
nect with General Warren at Robertson’s Tavern. 
The object of the attack is to form a junction with 
General Warren, which must be effected imme¬ 
diately.” This order was delivered to General 
French at half-past two o’clock. General French 
says, in his report of this affair, "that up to the 
time of receiving this order his efforts had been 
directed to ascertain the practicability of forcing 
the head of his column through the opposition in 
its front, but that he now, at half-past two, directed 
his order of battle, causing General Carr’s division 
to extend to the left of General Prince’s, which was 
already halted and deployed; and General Birney’s 


6 o 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


division to support the two; that while Carr’s 
division was taking position, the enemy were found 
forming line of battle to the left, and that Prince 
and Carr were soon closely engaged; that before 
sundown General Birney’s division relieved General 
Carr’s, as it was out of ammunition. 

The force encountered was Johnson’s division of 
Ewell’s corps. 

The contest of Prince’s and Carr’s divisions with 
Johnson’s was sharp, the brunt of it at first falling 
upon Carr’s, which at one time, finding the right of 
the enemy extending around its left flank, fell back, 
Prince’s division falling back with it into an open 
field, until a battery of artillery posted on the right 
was uncovered and its fire opened; then the whole 
line advanced again and forced the enemy back. 
Again the enemy attacked, and again was repulsed. 
Toward evening, at the request of General Johnson, 
General Rodes sent Doles’s brigade to his support. 

When the fire became hot, General Sedgwick sent 
forward two divisions of his corps to French’s sup¬ 
port, but they took no part in the action. 

With three times the force of Johnson, and hav¬ 
ing besides the whole of the Sixth Corps, equal in 
number to his own, near at hand, General French 
remained on the defensive. 

The casualties of the Third Corps, according to 
the report of General French, were thirty-six offi¬ 
cers and 845 enlisted men killed and wounded— 
making a total of 881 killed and wounded, with 
seventy-one officers and enlisted men missing, be¬ 
ing a total loss of 952. 


MEADE CONCENTRATING. 


61 


Johnson’s division lost sixty-nine officers and 
enlisted men killed, and 429 men wounded, making 
a total loss of 498. Among them were Colonel 
Walton, killed, and Colonel Colston, mortally 
wounded, while leading their commands, General 
Lee says, with conspicuous gallantry. 

To return to General Warren. General Meade 
did not deem it prudent for him to attack Early’s 
two divisions, as the two wings of his army were 
several miles distant, and the probability of the 
arrival of the Third and Sixth Corps at all 
during the day became less and less at each com¬ 
munication from General French. The Fifth 
and First Corps were, however, in the required 
positions on the left, and Generals Sykes and 
Newton were advised of the failure of the right 
column to arrive, and of the probability of its not 
arriving during the day. General Sykes was 
directed not to advance beyond New Hope Church, 
and General Newton, who was at Parker’s Store, 
was directed to hold himself ready to move to 
Robertson’s Tavern at any moment. Later, General 
Newton was ordered to Robertson’s Tavern, where 
he arrived at dusk. 

The enemy in front of Warren at length became 
so active and enterprising that General Warren 
made a feint of a general attack, Carroll’s brigade 
driving the enemy down the turnpike and capturing 
a number of prisoners from Gordon’s brigade of 
Early’s division. 

During the afternoon General Sedgwick was 
ordered to move to Robertson’s Tavern, leaving 


62 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


the Third Corps, and during the night the Third 
Corps was ordered to follow the Sixth. 

Let us now turn to General Hill, who, on the 
morning of the 27th, moved toward Fredericksburg 
by the plank-road, reaching Mine Run between 
two and three o’clock, when he was informed that 
our troops were advancing upon the plank-road, 
driving back the cavalry. His leading division, 
Heth’s, was hurried up, and about a mile from New 
Hope Church came up with the cavalry at four 
o’clock, when sharp skirmishing took place. At 
this time General Hill received an order to send a 
division to support General Early, and Anderson’s 
division moved to him. Communication between 
the two parts of their army was established, but on 
consultation with General Lee it was found advis¬ 
able for Hill not to advance. 

Gregg crossed at Ely’s Ford on the 26th, and 
halted for the night near the head-waters of the 
Po. On the 27th he moved past Parker’s Store 
and along the plank-road to New Hope Church, 
where he encountered the enemy’s cavalry, which 
were forced back a mile, and some prisoners capt¬ 
ured from them. General Sykes reached Parker’s 
Store on the 27th at 9 A.M., and with Gregg in his 
front, driving back the enemy’s cavalry, had come 
up to New Hope Church, where the road comes in 
from Robertson’s Tavern, at three o’clock. Here 
the enemy’s infantry were supporting their cavalry, 
but upon General Sykes’s arrival they became 
quiet. Sykes was now directed by General Meade 
not to advance until further orders, and during the 


LEE AND MEADE AT MINE RUN. 63 

night he was ordered to be at Robertson’s Tavern by 
daylight, as there were indications that Lee would 
concentrate by morning in front of that place. 

It is to be remarked on the occurrences of this 
day that the Third Corps remained substantially 
in the vicinity of Morris’s all day, and on the de¬ 
fensive, and not only prevented offensive opera¬ 
tions by the Second Corps, but completely neu¬ 
tralized the Sixth Corps also ; in fact paralyzed 
the whole army, so far as concerned its carrying out 
the plan of operations successfully. 

At daylight of the 28th the First, Second, and 
Sixth Corps moved forward along the pike, in 
line of battle, supported by the Third and Fifth 
Corps, but found only the pickets of the enemy, 
General Lee having fallen back during the night. 
Meade, advancing, found that Lee had taken up a 
strong position on the west side of Mine Run, 
which he had intrenched. 

A heavy rain set in early in the day, making it 
difficult to examine the enemy’s lines, and it was 
night by the time our troops were in position on 
the east bank of Mine Run. The examination 
made showed the enemy’s position to be too 
strong; to attack in front. The ravine of the run 
was difficult of passage, and the ground west of it 
was cleared for more than a thousand yards, rising 
very gradually over a hundred feet, with a space 
well up the ascent flanked by heavy belts of timber 
on both sides. The summit was crowned with 
intrenchments for infantry and artillery, strength¬ 
ened by abatis. 


6 4 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


It was therefore determined, on the evening of 
the 28th, that General Warren should withdraw 
from the front before morning, and, having Terry’s 
division of the Sixth Corps and 300 cavalry added to 
his force, move on the enemy’s right flank on the 
29th, so as to threaten it, and endeavor to discover 
a vulnerable point of attack, and if necessary to 
continue the movement, threatening to turn his 
right. The night of the 28th was dark and stormy. 

The others corps commanders were directed to 
examine critically the position of the enemy in 
their front during the 29th, and ascertain the prac¬ 
ticability of an assault. Toward evening General 
Wright, commanding the First Division, Sixth 
Corps, reported to General Meade that he had dis¬ 
covered a point on the enemy’s extreme left where an 
assault was practicable with inconsiderable loss. At 
the same time Captain Michler, of the Engineers, 
reported that an assault in front of the Third Corps, 
though hazardous, was not impracticable; and 
Major Ludlow, A. D. C. to General Meade, who 
had just returned from General Warren, stated that 
he (General Warren) had passed the head of Mine 
Run on the plank and Catharpin roads, and that 
the conditions there were favorable to an attack. 

Generals Newton and Sykes, commanders of the 
First and Fifth Corps, reported an attack from their 
front impracticable. 

Upon this information General Meade decided to 
attack at three points: one on the enemy’s extreme 
left, with the Fifth and Sixth Corps; one on his cen¬ 
tre, with the First and Third corps, and one on the 


MINE RUN. 


65 


enemy’s right, with the force under General Warren. 
General Warren, reporting at headquarters in per¬ 
son in the evening, was informed of these disposi¬ 
tions; and as General French, who also reported 
at headquarters in person, deemed his attack im¬ 
practicable, two divisions of the Third Corps were 
ordered over to General Warren, and the intended 
attack in the centre was dispensed with, the First 
Corps and the remaining division of the Third 
Corps being directed to make demonstrations in 
their front and unite in the attack if it proved suc¬ 
cessful on either flank. In the meantime the enemy 
had been constantly employed in strengthening their 
intrenchments, so that by the night of the 29th 
their position was, in their own judgment, strongly 
fortified. The presence of General Warren near 
their right caused them, during the night of the 
29th, to extend and further intrench it, and place 
their reserve troops in that quarter in line. Their 
right was on the Catharpin road at Antioch Church, 
their left thrown back near Zoar Church—Hill’s 
corps on their right, Ewell’s on their left. 

During the night the Fifth and Sixth Corps moved 
silently to their point of attack, unobserved by the 
enemy, and massed so as to be concealed from their 
view in the day; the two divisions of the Third Corps 
joined General Warren, and the night was spent in 
preparations for the attack on the morning of the 
30th. General Warren was to assault at eight 
o’clock, and, at the special request of General Sedg¬ 
wick, the artillery of the centre and right were to 
open at that hour, and continue their fire until nine 



66 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


o’clock, when General Sedgwick was to assault with 
the Fifth and Sixth Corps. Punctually at eight 
o’clock the artillery opened, replied to at once with 
several batteries by the enemy; but at ten minutes 
before nine o’clock Captain Roebling, of General 
Warren’s staff, arrived, bringing a despatch from him 
informing General Meade that he had suspended his 
attack until further orders, as he had found the en¬ 
emy’s works so formidable that he could not succeed : 
during the night their line had been reinforced with 
all the infantry and artillery it could hold, and their 
intrenchments completed with abatis. It would 
take Warren’s troops eight minutes to move in 
double-quick up to the enemy’s works, exposed to 
musketry and artillery fire. The attack of General 
Sedgwick was at once suspended, as there were no 
means of supporting him if repulsed, or of reinforc¬ 
ing him if successful. The plan of the attack was 
the only one that could be used ; but it was neces¬ 
sarily vicious, the two wings, containing more than 
three-fourths of the infantry, being five miles apart, 
with less than a fourth of the infantry in the inter¬ 
mediate space, though the artillery of the Third, 
First, and Fifth Corps was left in position there. 

General Meade immediately proceeded to General 
Warren’s column, hoping to arrange some plan by 
which the attack might take place later in the day, 
but found it impracticable. The troops of the 
Third and Sixth Corps, with General Warren, were 
at once ordered back to their corps, and as soon as 
night set in the Fifth and Sixth Corps were re¬ 
turned to their former positions on and to the right 


MINE RUN. 


6/ 


of the turnpike, they having been motionless in 
their concealed positions of attack from the time 
of reaching it the night before. 

General Sedgwick had prepared his command 
for prompt attack at 9 A. M., but received the 
order suspending it a few minutes before the hour 
fixed upon. 

The enemy, perceiving the intention to attack 
his left, proceeded to make the alterations in his 
line and the character of his defences necessary to 
insure his safety there. 

When the artillery fire opened in the morning, 
the skirmishers of the First and Third Corps ad¬ 
vanced across Mine Run, the enemy’s skirmishers 
falling back before them. At nightfall they were 
withdrawn. 

As the enemy’s intrenchments had been extended 
to Bartlett’s Mill, and now connected with those of 
the Rapidan, the only further operation that could 
be undertaken by the Army of the Potomac was a 
movement on the right flank of the enemy, aban¬ 
doning the turnpike and plank roads. But this re¬ 
quired the trains of the army, which had been left 
at Richardsville, on the north bank of the Rapi¬ 
dan, to be brought across the river and moved to 
our protected flank ; but winter, apparently, had 
already set in, such severe cold following the rain¬ 
storm of the 28th that some of the pickets v/ere 
frozen to death; and at any moment a similar rain¬ 
storm might render the country roads, which we 
should be obliged to use in such an operation, im¬ 
practicable for our trains and artillery ; the whole 


68 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


country at such times becoming impassable except 
on turnpikes and plank roads. 

Acknowledging the movement to have been a 
failure, General Meade determined to withdraw to 
his former position north of the Rapidan ; which 
was accomplished on the night of the 1st of De¬ 
cember, without the knowledge of the enemy. 

On the night of the 1st of December, General 
Lee directed General Hill to concentrate Ander¬ 
son’s and Wilcox’s divisions on his right, with a 
view to moving them on our left on the morning of 
the 2d. But at daylight it was discovered that we 
had withdrawn; Hill followed us from Parker’s 
store, picking up some 200 stragglers, when he 
learnt that we had recrossed the Rapidan. Early 
followed with two divisions—Johnson’s being sent 
to Morton’s Ford—one as far as the Wilderness 
Tavern, the other as far as Spottswood on the Ger- 
manna plank road, when he learnt we had recrossed 
the Rapidan. He picked up some 300 stragglers. 

But for the restrictions imposed on General 
Meade from Washington, he would have fallen 
back toward Fredericksburg, taking up a position 
in front of that town. Had he done so, the first 
battle with Lee, in May, 1864, would not have 
been fought in the Wilderness, but in a more open 
country. 

During the operation which has just been re¬ 
counted, Gregg’s cavalry division encountered the 
enemy’s cavalry successfully on the plank-road, 
near New Hope Church, on the 27th of November, 
and Stuart, with Hampton’s division, at Parker’s 


MEADE WITHDRAWS TO CULPEPER. 69 

Store on the 29th; Stuart having been directed to 
gain our rear and ascertain what we were doing. 
Learning toward evening that Hill’s right was 
threatened and a battle imminent, Stuart fell back 
to Antioch Church, and on the 30th posted his 
artillery so as to enfilade our line if it advanced. 
On the 30th Gregg covered our rear on the left, 
and with his division, with one brigade of the First 
Cavalry Division and two brigades of the Third 
Corps, covered the rear of the army in recrossing 
at Germanna, Culpeper Mine, and Ely’s fords. 

On the 26th of November, Custer, commanding 
Kilpatrick’s Third Cavalry division, made demon¬ 
strations at Morton’s Ford and at three other 
points above. On the morning of the 27th, the 
enemy having withdrawn his infantry from the 
Rapidan, General Custer crossed at Morton’s Ford 
and pursued some of the enemy’s cavalry, capturing 
a few prisoners. He continued to watch the fords 
of the Rapidan until the 3d of December, when he 
returned to Stevensburg. 

General Rosser, of Hampton’s cavalry division, 
picketing Ely’s and Culpeper Mine fords on the 
26th of November, moved back to Todd’s Tavern, as 
our troops advanced. There he learnt the next 
morning that there was a train of ordnance stores 
belonging to the Fifth and First Corps at Ely’s 
Ford. Waiting until Gregg’s division had passed, 
he moved by the Brock road to the Germanna 
plank-road, attacked the train, destroyed, according 
to his report, thirty-five or forty wagons, carried off 
eight of them with seven ambulances and 280 mules, 


70 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


and ninety-five prisoners (wagoners), but was driven 
off by the infantry. 

The casualties on both sides during these opera¬ 
tions, excepting those already mentioned, were 
small. 

According to the best information that General 
Meade was able to obtain at the time concerning 
the numerical strength of the Army of Northern 
Virginia during the operations of October and 
November, it was but little less than that of the 
Army of the Potomac ; but according to the official 
returns of the Confederate Armies, now in the War 
Department, it is found to have been much less. 

It will be observed that, although General Lee’s 
movement in October was made to bring on an 
engagement with the Army of the Potomac, yet 
when that army advanced toward him, as at the 
crossing of the Rappahannock, and at the crossing of 
the Rapidan, he selected a position, intrenched it, 
and awaited attack. It will be found, that in general 
he pursued a similar course in the operations of 
the following year, and in view of his inferior num¬ 
bers, it must be admitted to have been judicious. 




CHAPTER IV. 


The Army of the Potomac makes a Demonstration against Lee on 
the Rapidan to aid General Butler’s proposed Attack on Rich¬ 
mond, but only spoils its own chance for surprising Lee in his 
Winter Quarters—Kilpatrick’s attempt to capture Richmond, 
and release the prisoners of Libby and other Military Prisons. 

General Meade was now directed from Wash¬ 
ington to establish the Army of the Potomac for 
the winter between the Rapidan and the Rappa¬ 
hannock, or north of the Rappahannock, as he might 
prefer, though it was intimated to him that it was 
thought the latter position was preferable to the 
former from its being nearer to the Washington 
depots of supply. General Meade, however, con¬ 
cluded to remain between the two rivers, as an 
opportunity might occur during the winter for some 
enterprise against the enemy that would serve to 
retrieve the failure of the recent operation. The 
manner in which the Army of Northern Virginia 
was disposed for the winter gave promise of this. 
A small part of its force held the intrenchments 
along the Rapidan, the bulk of the army being en¬ 
camped or hutted several miles from the river on 
ground better adapted to the comfort and health 
of the troops. The Army of the Potomac, too, had 
apparently counted on a quiet winter, and large 
numbers of the families and friends of the officers 

71 


72 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


were allowed to visit them—a fact that was pretty 
certain to be made known to the enemy. All the 
conditions for a successful enterprise against the 
enemy, so far as they related to the position and 
sense of security of Lee’s army, now existed. There 
was one other condition that might at any time be 
looked for, which was essential to success—the state 
of the weather and of the roads. There sometimes 
occurred in the winter several successive days of 
weather in which the army might be moved secretly 
and rapidly to the Rapidan, and that condition was 
waited for, when on the 3d of February, General 
Sedgwick, commanding the army in the absence of 
General Meade, received a telegram from General 
B. F. Butler, at Old Point Comfort, asking him to 
make a movement against Lee on Saturday the 6th 
instant, to aid an operation he (General Butler) 
would begin that day. General Halleck requested 
General Sedgwick to give such co-operation as he 
could, and General Sedgwick consented to making 
a vigorous demonstration in his front, a flank move¬ 
ment being impracticable in the condition of the 
roads and the state of the weather then existing, 
though, as he informed General Halleck, the demon¬ 
stration might spoil the chances for the future. 

Accordingly, on the evening of the 5th General 
Kilpatrick was ordered to make a demonstration 
on the morning of the 6th, at the Culpeper Mine 
Ford; General Merritt at Barnett’s Ford; General 
Warren, with the Second Corps, with three batteries 
and three days’ rations, at Morton’s Ford; and 
General Newton, with the First Corps, taking three 


DEMONSTRATION TO AID BUTLER. 


73 


batteries, at Raccoon Ford. The weather was 
threatening, and a rain-storm set in at night, con¬ 
tinuing next day and night. An attempt to get 
the pontons to Morton’s Ford proved abortive, as 
did the attempt to get forward some of the artillery. 

The enemy at Morton’s .Ford was surprised. 
Through some misapprehension of the instructions, 
General Caldwell, in the absence of General War¬ 
ren, who was too unwell to be on the ground until 
late in the day, sent a small part of his force across 
the river, which captured the enemy’s outposts and 
advanced toward the works, the number of the 
enemy in which was evidently small. Later in the 
day the whole of Hays’s division of the Second 
Corps crossed the river, and a sharp contest took 
place toward sunset, the enemy having been by 
that time largely reinforced by the troops in the 
rear. General Webb’s division now crossed to the 
support of Flays, who was brought back at dark, 
and Webb’s division later in the night. The casual¬ 
ties in Flays’s division were over 200 officers and 
enlisted men killed and wounded. The demonstra¬ 
tions at the other points were made, and all were 
continued during the 7th, Merritt having some 
fighting at Barnett’s Ford. 

Under the orders of General Butler, General 
Wistar, with 4,000 infantry and 2,200 cavalry, left 
Williamsburg on Saturday morning, the 6th of 
February, to make a dash on Richmond and release 
the military prisoners there. He arrived at Bottom 
Bridge on the Chickahominy, about thirteen miles 
from Richmond, in the morning of the 7th, and 
4 



7 4 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


found the enemy there in force, and constantly re¬ 
ceiving reinforcements by railroad. The bridge had 
been taken up and the ford obstructed. As it was 
evident that the enemy had been made aware of 
the designs against Richmond—for there had been 
no Confederate troops at Bottom Bridge for two 
months previous—and had made dispositions to 
frustrate them, General Wistar withdrew. 

It appeared that one of General Butler’s enlisted 
men in confinement had escaped by the negligence 
of a sentinel, deserted to the enemy, and informed 
them of the intended movement. 

The demonstration at Morton’s Ford proved 
that, had the roads and weather been suitable for 
moving the army, a well-arranged plan for surprising 
them at that ford and throwing a large force 
quickly over the liver would have been successful, 
their intrenchments taken at this point and at 
Raccoon Ford, would have been turned, and their 
army encountered in detail. 

When General Meade was in Washington about 
the middle of February, the Secretary of War in¬ 
formed him that the President wished his amnesty 
proclamation distributed within the enemy’s lines, 
and had sent for General Kilpatrick to confer with 
him as to the practicability of accomplishing the 
object in connection with a cavalry expedition. 
Upon the return of General Meade to the army he 
called on General Kilpatrick for such a project, and 
received in reply a report from him, stating the 
force he would require, the routes his command 
should take, the time it would occupy, what he 


KILPATRICK’S RAID. 


75 


proposed to effect on the way to Richmond, and 
the points at which he, with the main force, and 
Colonel Dahlgren, with a detachment of 500 men, 
would enter the city. General Pleasonton, com¬ 
manding the cavalry, considered the scheme im¬ 
practicable under the circumstances then existing. 
General Meade learnt, however, that Richmond 
had for its land defence only some local troops, 
with field artillery, and a small cavalry force, 
Pickett’s division and other of Lee’s troops being 
in North Carolina and south of James River; that 
Hampton’s Cavalry Division, 1,500 strong, was in 
the vicinity of Fredericksburg, and on the railroad 
from that town to Richmond; and under these 
circumstances thought it possible by a secret, rapid, 
and bold movement, conducted with judgment, to 
take Richmond and release our prisoners before 
reinforcements from Lee’s troops or from any 
quarter could reach there. 

The release of the prisoners was the chief object 
of the expedition, which was sanctioned by the 
Secretary of War and the President, and every 
effort was made by General Meade to insure its 
success. 

Accordingly, General Kilpatrick, with a force of 
4,000 officers and enlisted men of cavalry and a 
battery of horse-artillery, was ordered by General 
Meade to cross the Rapidan at the lower fords early 
in the night of the 28th of February, and move 
with the utmost expedition by the shortest route 
past the enemy’s right flank to Richmond ; endeavor 
to enter that city, liberate our prisoners, and, if sue- 



76 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


cessful, conduct them within our lines at Williams¬ 
burg. General Kilpatrick was informed that, in 
order to create a diversion in his favor, a powerful 
expedition had been organized and would be in full 
movement on the 28th instant, to operate toward 
the left flank of the enemy in the direction of Char¬ 
lottesville as far as the railroad bridge across the 
Rivanna River near that town ; that this operation 
would be followed up by other movements of 
troops, and that it was expected in this way so to 
distract the attention of the enemy that every 
chance for the success of the expedition would be 
secured that it was practicable for him to provide 
for. Arrangements were also made by Colonel 
Sharpe, of the Secret Service Department, for cut¬ 
ting all the telegraph lines leading from General 
Lee’s forces to Richmond as soon as the expedition 
set out. 

General Sedgwick, with the Sixth Corps, was 
directed to move on the 27th so as to reach Madi¬ 
son Court House on the evening of the 28th ; Gen¬ 
eral Custer with his cavalry division to pass the 
Sixth Corps at that point, and proceed as far as the 
railroad bridge over the Rivanna, near Charlottes¬ 
ville, destroy the bridge if practicable, and cut the 
telegraph from Richmond to Lynchburg. General 
Birney, with his division of the Third Corps, was 
to follow General Sedgwick on the 28th as far as 
James City ; and the whole army was held in readi¬ 
ness to move at short notice. These movements 
on Lee’s left were continued until Wednesday, the 
2d of March, when the troops began to return, as 


KILPATRICK’S RAID. 


77 


it was expected that General Kilpatrick would 
reach Richmond Tuesday morning, March 1st. 

This demonstration on Lee’s left was begun with 
all the secrecy of a genuine operation, its objects not 
having been communicated even to General Sedg¬ 
wick, who commanded the troops engaged in it. 
Its chiei object was accomplished. 

General Kilpatrick crossed the Rapidan at Ely’s 
Ford early Sunday night, the 28th of February, 
captured the enemy’s picket there without firing a 
shot, and moved rapidly by way of Spottsylvania 
Court House, Ground Squirrel bridge over the 
South Anna, and the Brook pike which enters 
Richmond on the north side, doing such injury as 
he could, without any material delay, to the Cen¬ 
tral and Fredericksburg railroads where he crossed 
them. At 10 o’clock in the morning of Tuesday, 
March 1st, after a march of seventy or eighty miles, 
he was on the Brook pike five miles from Richmond, 
where he learned that his approach to the city was 
entirely unknown there, and that only a small force 
of infantry occupied the intrenchments on that 
road. Moving forward to the interior line of de¬ 
fensive works, encountering on his way only pickets 
and their supports, he found infantry and artillery 
in them. Some skirmishing ensued with trifling 
loss on both sides. General Kilpatrick says it was 
now about I o’clock, and he was about to attack, 
when he saw the enemy receive reinforcements of 
infantry and artillery; and feeling confident that 
Dahlgren had failed to cross the river, and that his 
own attempt would be a “ bloody failure,” he with- 


78 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


drew his command. That night he encamped near 
Atlee Station, on the Central Railroad, north of the 
Chickahominy. But General Kilpatrick was mis¬ 
taken ; the only force opposed to him was 500 men 
with six field-guns, and had he made a determined 
charge, he would have taken Richmond and accom¬ 
plished the objects of the expedition. 

Considering the circumstances under which he 
was before Richmond, it was incumbent upon him 
to have dismounted his command, and to have led 
it in person in an assault upon the intrenchments. 

It appears that Colonel Bradley Johnson, who 
was at or near Guinea Station on the Fredericks¬ 
burg Railroad, succeeded in telegraphing to Rich¬ 
mond on the 29th of February, before our troops cut 
the wires, that a strong force of our cavalry was 
on a raid, and, although no apprehension for the 
safety of Richmond was felt in that city, yet, as a 
matter of precaution, Colonel Stevens, of the En¬ 
gineers, moved such force as he had of infantry and 
field artillery to the line of fortifications on the 
Brook road, and on the road to Meadow Bridge 
(over the Chickahominy) early Tuesday morning, 
the 1st of March. Colonel Stevens states that he 
had 500 men and six field-guns on the Brook road, 
but says nothing of receiving or expecting any ad¬ 
dition to his force on either road; his loss was 
trifling. There was no encounter on the Meadow 
Bridge road. 

Colonel Bradley Johnson followed Kilpatrick 
from Beaver Dam Station to the vicinity of Rich¬ 
mond, where he joined General Hampton, who had 


KILPATRICK’S RAID. 


79 


hastily got his cavalry together, and, moving toward 
Richmond, attacked General Kilpatrick Tuesday 
night, near Atlee’s Station, and captured the camp 
of one of his brigades; then followed him down the 
peninsula, General Kilpatrick arriving at Williams¬ 
burg on Wednesday night. 

Captain Mitchell, with 300 of Colonel Dahlgren’s 
party, joined Kilpatrick near Tunstall’s Station, on 
the York River Railroad; Colonel Dahlgren, with 
the remainder of his force, having become separated 
from him during Tuesday night. 

Colonel Dahlgren, with his command, left Gener¬ 
al Kilpatrick’s route Sunday night, the 28th of Feb¬ 
ruary, at or near Spottsylvania Court House, sent 
a detachment to cut the telegraph and destroy the 
railroad at Guinea Station, moved across the Vir¬ 
ginia Central Railroad near Frederickshall, and 
thence to James River, near Goochland Court 
House, where, in the vicinity of the plantation of 
Mr. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, or 
at some lower ford, he expected to cross James 
River and enter Richmond from the south side, 
after releasing the prisoners at Belle Isle ; and then, 
uniting with General Kilpatrick at 10 o’clock Tues¬ 
day morning, aid in the release of our prisoners 
confined in the city prisons. 

‘Colonel Dahlgren, finding no practicable fords, 
was unable to cross James River, and moved down 
its north bank to Richmond, doing such damage to 
the James River and Kanawha Canal as the brief 
time at his disposal admitted, and destroying such 
military supplies as he found. Approaching the 


8o 


GETTYSBURG TO THE RAPIDAN. 


city late in the afternoon, he encountered some 
force of infantry, with which his command had 
sharp skirmishing; when, night coming on, and no 
word having been received from Kilpatrick, whose 
guns had been heard early in the afternoon, he 
withdrew, believing that Kilpatrick had failed to 
enter the city. Taking the lead, he became sepa¬ 
rated in the night from the larger part of his com¬ 
mand under Captain Mitchell, crossed the Pamun- 
key at Hanovertown and the Mattapony at Ey- 
lett’s, apparently on his way to Gloucester, opposite 
Yorktown; but on Wednesday night fell into an 
ambush about three miles from King and Queen 
Court House, where he was killed. The ambush 
was formed chiefly through the efforts of Captain 
Fox and Lieutenant Pollard, who collected a num¬ 
ber of men on furlough from Lee’s army, the Home 
Guard of King and Queen County, and a squadron 
commanded by Captain Magruder. Many of the 
men with Dahlgren were killed and wounded, and 
the greater part of the remainder captured.* 

Not long after his return to the Army of the 
Potomac from this expedition, General Kilpatrick 
was relieved from duty with that army. 


*For the correspondence that took place respecting certain papers 
said to have been found on the person of Colonel Dahlgren (which 
correspondence was duly transmitted to the Secretary of War), see 
Appendix. 



APPENDIX. 83 

Among the instructions contained in the second paper are 
the following : 

“ The bridges once secured and the prisoners loose and 
over the river, the bridges will be secured and the city de¬ 
stroyed. The men must keep together and well in hand, and 
once in the city it must be destroyed and Jeff Davis and 
Cabinet killed. Pioneers will go along with combustible 
material.” 

In obedience to my instructions, I beg leave respectfully to 
inquire whether the designs and instructions of Colonel 
Dahlgren, as set forth in these papers, particularly those con¬ 
tained in the above extracts, were authorized by the United 
States Government, or by his superior officer, and also 
whether they have the sanction and approval of those 
authorities. 

I have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

R. E. Lee, 

General, 


Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

April 17, 1864. 

General Robert E. Lee, 

Commanding Army Northern Virginia. 

General: I received on the 15th inst., per flag of truce, 
your communication of the 1st instant, transmitting photo¬ 
graphic copies of two documents, alleged to have been found 
on the body of Colonel U. Dahlgren, and inquiring “ whether 
the designs and instructions of Colonel Dahlgren, as set forth 
in these papers, particularly those contained in the above ex¬ 
tracts, were authorized by the United States Government or 
by his superior officers ; and also whether they have the sanc¬ 
tion and approval of these authorities.” 

In reply, I have to state that neither the United States Gov- 
erment, myself, nor General Kilpatrick authorized, sanctioned, 



84 


APPENDIX. 


or approved the burning of the City of Richmond and the 
killing of Mr. Davis and his Cabinet, nor any other act not 
required by military necessity and in accordance with the 
usages of war. 

In confirmation of this statement, I inclose a letter from 
General Kilpatrick, and have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

George G. Meade, 

Major- General. 


Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

April 16, 1864. 

Brig.-Genl. J. Kilpatrick. 

I am directed by the Major-General Commanding to advise 
you that he desires you to send him a copy of your letter of 
March 15th, in reference to the instructions given the late 
Colonel Dahlgren, at the very earliest moment practicable, 
and that he desires to see you personally upon the subject at 
these Headquarters as soon as the copy of the letter is for¬ 
warded. 

Very respectfully, &c., 

Charles E. Pease, 

Captaui and A. A. G. 


Headquarters Third Division Cavalry Corps, 

April 16, 1864. 

Brig.-General S. Williams, 

A. A. G. Army of the Potomac. 

General : In accordance with instructions from Head¬ 
quarters Army of the Potomac, I have carefully examined 
officers and men who accompanied Colonel Dahlgren on his 
late expedition. 

All testify that he published no address whatever to his com- 




APPENDIX. 


85 


mand, nor did he give any instructions, much less of the char¬ 
acter as set forth in the photographic copies of two papers 
alleged to have been found upon the person of Colonel Dahl- 
gren, and forwarded by Genl. Robt. E. Lee, Commanding the 
Army of Northern Virginia. 

Colonel Dahlgren, one hour before we separated at my 
Headquarters, handed to me an address that he intended 
to read to his command ; that paper was indorsed in red 
ink “ Approved,” over my official signature. The photo¬ 
graphic papers referred to are true copies of the paper ap¬ 
proved by me, save so far as they speak of “ exhorting the 
prisoners to destroy and burn the hateful city and kill the trai¬ 
tor Davis and his Cabinet,” and in this, that they do not con¬ 
tain the indorsement referred to as having been placed by 
me on Colonel Dahlgren’s papers. 

Colonel Dahlgren received no orders from me to pillage, 
burn or kill, nor were any such instructions given me by my 
superiors. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

J. Kilpatrick, 

Brig.-Gen. Vo is. 


Respecting this matter, General Fitzhugh Lee has written 
a letter, to be found on pages 256, 257 and 258 of Dawson’s 
Historical Magazine, April, 1870, New Series, Vol. VII., 
No. IV. In it he says that he was in Richmond (unofficially), 
“ when, on the second morning after Colonel Dahlgren’s 
death, Lieutenant James Pollard, of the Ninth Virginia Cav¬ 
alry, brought me some papers and an artificial leg, which, he 
said, had been taken from the body of one of the officers of 
the enemy named Dahlgren, and who had been killed in King 
and Queen County. Pollard was one of my officers, accident¬ 
ally in that vicinity at the time, and hence brought the 
papers first to me. Upon ascertaining their contents, I im¬ 
mediately took them to Mr. Davis.” 



86 


APPENDIX. 


He goes on to state that he found Mr. Benjamin with Mr. 
Davis, and that the papers were read, and that he then car¬ 
ried them to General Cooper, Adjutant-General, to be filed in 
his office. After some discussion of the matter and of Kil¬ 
patrick’s movements, he says : 

“ I have only to add, in conclusion, that what appeared in 
the Richmond papers of that period as the ‘ Dahlgren papers,’ 
was correctly taken from the papers I carried in person to 
Mr. Davis, and that these papers were not added to or changed 
in the minutest particular before they came into my posses¬ 
sion, as far as I know and believe, and that from all the facts 
in my possession I have every reason to believe they were 
taken from the body of Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, and came to 
me without any alteration of any kind.” 

Then follows a copy of the “ Dahlgren papers” as published 
in the Richmond Examiner , April i, 1864, referred to by 
General Lee ; and, in conclusion, there is a copy of General 
Fitzhugh Lee’s letter to General Cooper of March 31, 1864, 
transmitting Colonel Dahlgren’s note-book, which had just 
been sent him by Colonel Beale, commanding Ninth Virginia 
Cavalry, the existence of which note-book General Lee had 
not before been aware of. He says that on the first page 
Colonel Dahlgren’s name and rank were written, and that 
among other memoranda it contained a rough pencil sketch 
of his address to his troops, differing somewhat from his pen- 
and-ink copy. General Lee adds that “ the original papers 
bore no marks of alteration, nor could they possibly have been 
changed except by the courier who brought them to me, 
which is in the highest degree improbable; and the publica¬ 
tion of them in the daily Richmond papers were exact copies, 
in every respect, of the original.” 





















































1 


APPENDIX. 


Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

March 14, 1864. 

Commanding Officer, 

Cavalry Corps. 

The Major-General Commanding 1 directs that careful in¬ 
quiry be made to ascertain whether Colonel Dahlgren made, 
or issued, such an address to his command as that which has 
been published in the journals of to-day, and also whether 
any orders or directions of the character of those contained 
in the memorandum following the address were given to his 
command, or to any part of it. 

Very respectfully, &c., 

A. A. Humphreys, 
Maf.-Genl. and Chief of Staff. 


Headquarters third Division Cavalry Corps, 

March 16, 1864. 

Capt. F. C. Newhall, 

A. A. A. G. Cavalry Corps. 

Captain : In accordance with instructions from Head¬ 
quarters Cavalry Corps, I have carefully examined officers 
and men who accompanied Colonel Dahlgren on his late ex¬ 
pedition. 

All testify that he published no address whatever to his 
command, nor did he give any instructions—much less of the 
character alleged in the Rebel journals, in the memorandum 
following his address. Colonel Dahlgren, one hour before 
we separated at my headquarters, handed me an address that 
4* 8l 





82 


APPENDIX. 


he intended to read to his command ; that paper was indorsed 
in red ink, “approved,” over my official signature. 

The alleged address of Colonel Dahlgren, published in the 
papers, is the same as the one approved by me, save so far as 
it speaks of “ exhorting the prisoners to destroy and burn the 
hateful city and kill the traitor Davis and his Cabinet.” All 
this is false, and published only as an excuse for the barbarous 
treatment of the remains of a brave soldier. 

Very respectfully, 

Your obedient servant, 

J. Kilpatrick, 

Brig. - Gen. Vo Is. 


Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 

i st April, 1864. 

Major-General George G. Meade, 

Comdg. Army of the Potomac. 

General : I am instructed to bring to your notice two 
papers found upon the body of Colonel U. Dahlgren, who was 
killed while commanding a part of the Federal Cavalry during 
the late expedition of General Kilpatrick. To enable you to 
understand the subject fully, I have the honor to inclose pho¬ 
tographic copies of the papers referred to, one of which is an 
address to his officers and men bearing the official signature 
of Colonel Dahlgren ; and the other, not signed, contains 
more detailed explanations of the purpose of the expedition, 
and more specific instructions as to its execution. 

In the former this passage occurs : 

“We hope to release the prisoners from Belle Island first, 
and having seen them fairly started, we will cross the James 
River into Richmond, destroying the bridges after us, and 
exhorting the released prisoners to destroy and burn the 
hateful city ; and do not allow the Rebel leader, Davis, and 
his traitorous crew to escape. The prisoners must render 
great assistance, as you cannot leave your ranks too far, or 
become too much scattered, or you will be lost.” 



THE 


CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR. 


OPINIONS OF THE PRESS ON THE SERIES. 


From the CINCINNATI COMMERCIAL. 

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history of the war, and the fidelity and care with which the several writers have 
performed their tasks. * * * That which has been now done by the authors 

of ‘ The Campaigns’ will never need to be done again.” 

From the UTICA (N. Y.) HERALD. 

“As this series approaches its close the reader is compelled to testify that it 
has already become the standard history of the war of the rebellion as a whole, 
and it will be long, if ever, before any rival can supplant it.” 

From the N. Y. CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE. 

“ The altogether admirable series on the 1 Campaigns of the Civil War ’ draws 
near completion. We doubt if a better and more evenly sustained series can be 
found on any subject. More than any other work, this will be the trusted history 
of our civil war,” 

From the New York TRIBUNE. 

“A high degree of editorial tact and intelligence characterizes the execution 
of Messrs. Scribner’s excellent undertaking. The division of the work is judici¬ 
ous ; the allotment of topics to the various writers is happy, and cordial co-opera¬ 
tion has been secured from recognized authorities, from the Government, from 
distinguished military officers, and from the custodians of public and private 
records. To all this we may add that the volumes are convenient in size, beauti¬ 
fully printed, and furnished with many clear and simple maps.” 


CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS, Publishers, 

743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 






THE NAVY IN THE CIVIL WAR 


r T'HE WORK OF THE NAVY in the Suppression of the Rebellion was 
certainly not less remarkable than that of the Army. The same forces 
which developed from our volunteers some of the finest bodies of soldiers in 
military history, were shown quite as wonderfully in the quick growth—almost 
creation—of a Navy, which was to cope, for the first time, with the problems of 
modern warfare. The facts that the Civil War was the first great conflict in 
which steam was the motive power of ships ; that it was marked by the introduc¬ 
tion of the ironclad ; and that it saw, for the first time, the attempt to blockade 
such a vast length of hostile coast — will make it an epoch for the technical 
student everywhere. For Americans, whose traditions of powers at sea are 
among their strongest, this side of the four years struggle has an interest fully 
equal to the other—perhaps even with the added element of romance that always 
belongs to sea fighting. 

But while the Army has been fortunate in the number and character of those 
who have contributed to its written history, the Navy has been comparatively 
without annalists. During a recent course of publications on the military opera¬ 
tions of the war, the publishers were in constant receipt of letters pointing out 
this fact, and expressing the wish that a complete naval history of the four 
years might be written by competent hands. This testimony was hardly needed 
to suggest the want ; but it was a strong encouragement to ask the co-operation 
of naval officers in supplying it. An effort made in this direction resulted in 
the cordial adoption and carying out of plans by which Messrs. Charles 
Scribner’s Sons are enabled to publish a work of the highest authority and 
interest, covering this entire field, in the following three volumes, giving the 
whole narrative of Naval Operations from 1861 to 1865. 

I.—The Blockade and the Cruisers . 

By Professor J. Russell Soley, U. S. Navy. 

II.—The Atlantic Coast. 

By Rear-Admiral Daniel Ammen, U. S. Navy. 

III.—The Gulf and Inland Waters. 

By Commander A. T. Mahan, U. S. Navy. 

The Volumes are uniform in size with the Series of ‘‘ Cam¬ 
paigns of the Civil War,” and contain maps and diagrams 
prepared under the direction of the authors. 

Brice per volume, $1.00. 


CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS, Publishers, 
743 and 745 Broadway, New York. 





























































